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ABSTRACT 
This thesis looks at the changing roles of the New 
Zealand armed forces from 1965 to 1980. It deals with 
four particular roles. The Alliance role, Territorial 
role, Regional role, and Civil role, and attempts to deter-
mine whether there has been any change in each role's part-
icular operation and in the lative importance of the 
four roles overall. 
Research for this subject consisted basically of a 
study of defence policy statements and opinions as put 
forward by political and military people and contained ln 
such things as the annual Defence Report, the periodic 
Defence Review and newspaper sources. Representatives of 
each of the groups concerned with defence, poli cians, 
civil servants and military personnel were interviewed in 
Wellington during 1979: also a study of the suitability of 
existing and proposed equipment for each of the four roles 
was conducted. 
The main features that became apparent as a result 
of this study were: the influence of financial constraints 
as a primary determinant of defence policy; the inferior 
position of New Ze and's defence forces in comparison 
with those of other nations throughout the Asian-Pacific 
region; and an apparent downturn in the overall importance 
of New Zealand's defence forces implied in recent policy 
decisions and by the decline of military capabilities 
during the period between 1965 and 1980. 
iv. 
As well as this general trend in New Zealand defence 
there were also interesting trends within each of the 
four particular roles. The most significant aspect of the 
New Zealand armed forces today is the civil role. Without 
the services carried out by the armed forces, the country 
as a whole would be left in the difficult situation of 
having to provide these services from elsewhere. And the 
military would be left without a suitable justification 
for their continued existence on the present scale. In 
contrast to this, each of the other roles has been allotted 
less importance over the years. 
The question of maintaining a military capability 
is a difficult one for New Zealand and many of the problems 
choices and decisions as they relate to the four main 
roles are loO.ked at here. 
v. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The subject of defence is an important one for any 
country. In times of war and internatiohal unrest it 
takes precedence over all the other requirements of society 
This is accepted by the population as being necessary and 
unavoidable if they wish their country to retain its 
independence and autonomy. In times when there is no 
such threat, however, and when the nations of the world 
are co-existing relatively peacefully the question of 
defence takes on a more delicate nature. Then it becomes 
one of "do we really need any defence at all and can we 
afford it?" It is not the aim here to decide what types 
of defence New Zealand requires, if indeed we need any at 
all. The assumption is that "so long as war lurks in the 
background of international politics, the question is 
not whether states require military power, but how much 
and what kinds of military power are most appropriate for 
achieving a given state's objectives."l 
Accepting this as being true for New Zealand, the 
aim will be to look at the types of-defence roles consid-
ered necessary in New Zealand and the changes these have 
undergone in the fifteen year period between 1965 and 
1980. The reasons for any noticable changes in priorities 
or importance will be sought as they relate to factors 
such as financial constraints, international influences, 
d A. Sonderman, William C. Olson, David S. 
McLellan, The Theory and Practice of Inter'national Relation~ 
3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice Hall, 1970) 
p. 168. 
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political influences and so on. 
The roles of the armed forces will be considered 
under four headings. These are: an alliance role, a 
territorial role, a regional role and a non-military or 
civil role. The alliance role refers to those activities 
of the armed forces that are directly related to alliance 
requirements. This would include such things as any cap-
ability New Zealand had to acquire either to t in with 
our ANZUS all , or else to remain credibl~ in their eyes. 
The territorial role relates directly to those defence 
capabilities and objectives that are designed solely to 
protect New Zealand's land and sea area. This would 
involve such things as short range air and sea capabiliti~s 
and permanent shore based defence establishments. The 
regional role is concerned with the part New Zealand plays 
in the South Pacific especially and also further a ld in 
South East Asia. This includes training the armed forces 
of some of these countries and in some cases stationing 
troops in these countries. The fourth role is the non-
military or civil role and is concerned with all of those 
services that the armed forces provide for the civil comm-
unity that are not directly military in nature~ -Things 
such as search and rescue and fish~ries protectiori. 
All of the activities and duties of the armed 
forces can be seen as belonging to one of these four roles. 
Some may overlap two or more different roles but none 
should be completely separate to any of the four. By 
looking at each of these four in turn some indication of 
the relative importance of each over time may become 
3 
apparent. In this way it should be possible to determine 
what changes have taken place in the New Zealand defence 
scene between 1965 and 1980. The changes in relative 
" 
importance may indicate a trend in defence which is likely 
to continue into the eighties and which has probably 
already been determined by equipment purchases and decision 
making during this period. The obje.<::tive then will be to 
determine why these changes have occurred. Has it been in 
response to specific determining factors in the internation 
sphere that have influenced the defence strategies of all 
small states, or has it been caused by domestic political 
factors? The means of discovering these causes and their 
influence ol'defence will be discussed further below. 
The time period chosen, 1965 to 1980, or fifteen 
years may seem fairly short, but in the field of defence 
much can happen in fifteen years. Weapons can become 
obsolete, economic circumstances can change, and the balanc 
of power, both in a regional and an international sense, 
can shift, amongst others. During this fifteen year period 
there have been many significant changes. Tensions between 
the United States and the Soviet Union have eased, while 
Sino-Soviet tensions have increased. 2 Both American and 
British troops have withdrawn from South-East Asia, espec-
ially since the end of the Vietnam war, leaving something 
of a super-power vacuum in the Asian Pacific region. There 
have also been advances in the accuracy and range of the 
weapons, both nuclear and non-nuclear, possessed by 
21978 Defence Review (Government Printer : Wellington) 
p. 5. 
4 
the increasing numbers of developing military powers. In 
the immediate New Zealand area, the 1977 introduction of 
a 200 mile economic zone, the independence achieved by 
many South Pacific nations, the declining economic situa-
tion and the end of conflict in the region have been some 
of the significant changes. 
Studying this period also means that three Defence 
Reviews can be compared, those of 1966, 1972 and 1978. 
This, along with a study of other official statements will 
enable a comparison to be made of policy throughout the 
period. The most obvious aspects of defence policy during 
this period have been the gradual decline in defence 
spending as a percentage of the total government spending, 
coupled with a decline in spending on capital equipment, 
the involvement of New Zealand troops in Vietnam between 
19a] land 1971, and the end of conscription in 1972 as a 
result of the coming to power of a Labour Government. These 
and many other facto\t'.s will be considered as part of the 
study of changes in defen¥ive roles during this period. 
Before going any further it is necessary to look at 
New Zealand's position in the overall world situation and 
the influence this will have over any decisions relating 
to defence. New Zealand exhibits all four of the char-
acteristics that East uses to determine whether a country 
can be described as a small state. These are 
"(1) small land area, (2) small total pop-
ulation, (3) small total GNP and (4) a low 
level of military capabilities." 3 
3 ' Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, Charles Herman 
(eds.). Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives 'for 
Comparative policy Studies (Canada/Beverly Hills :: Sage 
Publications, 1978), p. 557. 
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New Zealand also exhibits several other characteristics 
which, while not common to all small states, can have an 
important influence when they are present. These are a 
democratically elected government, a very low level of 
perceived threat, either from internal or external sources, 
and a general willingness on the part of the population 
as a whole to advocate extensive or even moderate military 
growth. These factors combined with the low GNP and the 
rapidly escalating costs of modern military equipment con-
tribute greatly towards any decisions on what type of 
military posture or readiness to adopt. 
As a small state New Zealand also exhibits several 
other characteristics common to such nations. These 
include:-
(a) low levels of overall participation in world 
affairs, 
(b) high levels of activity in inter:-governmental 
organisations, 
(c) high levels of support for international legal 
norms, 
(d) avoidance of the use of force as a technique 
of statecraft, 
(e) avoidance of behaviour and policies which 
tend to alienate the more powerful states in the 
system, 
(f) a narrow functional and geographical range of 
concern in foreign policy activities, 
(g) frequent utilization of moral and normative 
positions on international issues. 4 
All of these factors have an influence over the conduct of 
New Zealand's defence strategies. 
Many of them are obvious. For instance, lithe 
, 
small state because it is small has an exceptionally slim 
margin of safety or security - in terms of both space and 
4 East, et al., p. 563. 
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time. 115 Whereas a larger power can push conflict away 
from its boundaries a small power must fight at its vital 
boundaries. Also, because of the smaller resources of a 
small power a given fraction of the GNP will yield less 
than would be the case in a larger state. The end result 
of these factors is that whilst a small state might 
desire greater defence capabilities it often has to settle 
for less than it feels is sufficient. 
As far as the other characteristics are concerned 
New Zealand can also be classed as a typical small state. 
One noticable indicator concerns 'the frequent utilization 
of moral and normative positions on international affair~s' 
The New Zealand action - or more specifically, the Labour 
Government's action - in sending the frigates Canterbury 
and Otago to observe the French nuclear testing at Mururoa 
in 1974 provides a perfect example of this. New Zealand 
also conforms to the other general characteristics. Our 
general conformity to. super-power desires, an increasing 
concern with events in our own geographical region and the 
other factors such as low participation in world affairs 
and support for legal norms all place New Zealand as a 
small power. While all small powers are different in their 
own ways it must be accepted that this will be a major 
determining factor in so far as their defence policies 
and attitudes are concerned. 
In looking at the defence situation in New Zealand, 
particularly as it existed during the fifteen years from 
David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of 
the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford : Clar-
endon Press, 1967), p. 59. 
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1965 to 1980 it is necessary to look at all of the import-
ant influencing factors and their relative influence. 
These factors can be divided into two basic groups. One, 
those determinants in the international environment that 
are likely to influence New Zealand policy making. And 
two, those factors in the domestic environment that are 
likely to influence policy-making particularly as it 
relates to defence. 
The international factors include the overall poli-
tical situation, and the economic situation especiallyp 
During this period the political situation has undergone 
changes in so far as it relates to New Zealand and other-
wise. As previously mentioned United States/Soviet 
relations have improved to a stage where they are probably 
less likely to lead to conflict now than at any other time 
since the second world war. Sino-Soviet relations have 
obviously taken a downward turn during this period but 
they appear to be stabilised at present. Along with this 
improvement in relations, conflict in the Asian Pacific 
region has ended and together these factors mean that there 
are less obvious threats to New Zealand in recent times 
than there have been previously. Specific factors that 
relate directly to defence roles such as alliance require-
ments will be dealt with more closely later. However it 
is important to remember that one of the most significant 
international determinants of New Zealand's defence situa-
tion is our membership of ANZUS. The international econo-
mic situation has also had an influence in so far as New 
Zealand's defence is concerned. Apart from the obvious 
8 
factor that inflation has put the increasingly complex 
and expensive modern weapons systems almost beyond the 
reach of smaller states such as New Zealand, there is also 
a broader role played by economic factors in New Zealand's 
situation. As the 1978 Defence Review said, "the problems 
this country is now facing are economic rather than milit-
ary.,,6 It is against a background of increasing economic 
changes that "New Zealand must reshape its defence policy." 
Factors such as Britain joining the European Community, 
the increased prosperity'of the South East Asian countries 
and difficulties with the oil producing countries are all 
significant in this respect and will become more apparent 
throughout this study. 
As well as these external influences on the New 
Zealand political scene and therefore on the defence scene, 
there are also significant domestic factors that are imp-
ortant in determining the priorities that will be accorded 
to the New Zealand defence scene overall and to various 
aspects in particular. The major domestic factors are, 
broadly speaking, political and economic. As far as pol-
itical factors are concerned a major development during 
this period was the change of government in 1972 and the 
resultant changes brought about by this. The most obvious 
change was the end of conscription, introduced soon after 
Labour came to power in 1972. This effectively altered 
the whole makeup of the New Zealand armed forces, taking 
1978 Defence Review, p. 5. 
7Ibid . 
9 
8 them from a base force of l2~992 men, which could be 
supplemented by a potential civil component in times of 
need of many thousands, to a situation whereby they 
consisted of a 12,670 man9 base force and a smaller volunt-
ary territorial force that could be mobilised when 
required. The Labour Government also undertook a slight 
downgrading of the armed forces reducing their share of the 
GNP from 2.0 per cent in 197210 to 1.7 per cent in 1975. 11 
The Labour view was that "there was no threat to New 
Zealand, therefore it was hard to justify any increase in 
spending. 1112 They did, however, accept the fact that 
lithe main thing was to have a base force on which any 
building could take place when required.,,13 
Although the Labour Government was replaced by a 
National one in 1975 there was no reversion to the prev-
ious system of conscription and in fact there was no step-
ping up of defence spending to its previous level. 
Therefore the 1972 to 1975 period saw the beginning of 
significant changes in New Zealand's defence base. As 
will be seen in a later chapter the reluctance of the 
New Zealand people to support any increases in defence 
spending has resulted in changes ta~ing place in the patt-
ern of defence spending in that more emphasis would seem 
to be placed on civil service type duties. The politicians 
Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1971, p. 16. 
9Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1975, p. 16. 
10New Zealand Year Book, 1974, p. 267. 
llNew Zealand Year Book, 1976, p. 258. 
l2Interview with Arthur Faulkner, 12 December 1979. 
l3Ibid • 
10 
of course, must be seen to be using the armed forces as 
effectively as possible. 
I , , 1 h d '" ~ d' Po 1 tlca c anges or eClslons ln New Zea(,an s 
'. 
domestic scene therefore have had significant influences 
on defence factors. Many political moves result from 
economic factors since the economic situation is an 
important determinant of defence related factors as well 
as many other elements of society. The most obvious econ-
omic element of modern defence is the cost of providing 
the armed forces with sufficient quantities of up to date 
weapon systems. Here four main trends playa significant 
14 part: 
(a) the rising cost and technical complexity of 
high grade weapons systems, 
(b) the rising absolute and proportionate cost of 
research and development, 
(c) the rising optimum scale of production of 
modern weapons, 
(d) the high element of risk and uncertainty 
attached to the design process, production and 
employment. 
Because of these factors modern weapons systems are 
very expensive especially since no small state can afford 
to or has the resources to produce them for themselves. 
It requires the expenditure of vast amounts of overseas 
funds to develop and maintain an effective mi tary force. 
Coupled with the great and increasing costs involved 
and the relatively poor and deteriorating economic circum-
stances of New Zealand. New Zealanp's balance of payments 
situation in 1964-65 waS;-~~8,350,000,15 whereas by 1978 
it had become - $715,800,000. It is against this back-
1, p. 153. 
l5New Zealand Year Book, 1979, p. 636. 
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ground that the defence budget must be arrived at, and 
probably as a result of this decline in the economic 
situation, spending in defence as a percentage of the GNP 
has declined from 2.1 per cent17 in 1965 to 1.68 per cent 
in 1977. 18 These then are the important influencing 
factors on any country's defence policies. Both external 
factors such as the potential threat and internal factors 
such as the economic situation play an important part in 
the overall question of de~ence requirements and roles. 
This will hopefully become more apparent as each particular 
defence role is looked at in turn. 
In the case of each of the four roles the aim is 
to compare their individupl positions at the start of the 
1965-1980 period and again at the end in an effort to see 
to what extent each role has developed or declined during 
this period. If it appears that there has been signific-
ant changes in the priorities accorded to a certain role 
then the reasons for this will be examined. Any change in 
the relative importance of the four roles will be studied 
also. A conscious attempt to develop one role at the 
expense of one or more of the others will be a significant 
indication of changes in defence policy and the reasons 
behind this will be vital to the conclusions that will be 
reached. 
It is not possible to have access to all the 
decision-making processes of the defence policy makers but 
it is possible to study many of their decisions and their 
17 New Zealand Year Book, 1974, p. 267. 
18Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1979, p. 26. 
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consequences and often the information on which these 
decisions have been based will also be available. This 
is how this study will be conducted. It will :use _a 
descriptive base and an attempt to develop this into a 
broader discussion of policy-making approaches and conse-
quences. Important sources of this information will be 
the annual defence reports, the periodic defence reviews, 
official statements to the media and personal interviews 
.;1 . 
wi th some of thl'se intimately connected with the whole 
/< 
question of New Zealand's defence. By comparing policy 
objectives and their implications, in so far as equipment 
purchased and capabilities achieved are concered, an 
indication of the changing priorities and roles of defence 
may be obtained. Before beginning this it is perhaps 
useful to briefly discuss several important ements of 
defence today, elements that are particularly relevant in 
the New Zealand situation. 
The whole question of defence is an arbitrary one for 
any nation. There are no set down criteria specifying 
exactly what capabilities a certain sized nation requires 
to successfully deter an attack from a certain sized 
aggressor. There are so many facto~s involved in such a 
calculation, such as the geographical location and size 
of both parties, the alliance involvements of both parties, 
the type of weapons operated by both parties, the train-
ing of the armed forces, the logistical support and so 
on, that any statement about one nation's defensive 
position in relation to another is completely arbitrary. 
It is for this reason that defence provides such a 
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headache for any nation and any Government. The Govern-
ment must decide what degree of threat exists, whether 
their own forces are capable of resisting it and if not 
whether it is possible to develop sufficient forces to 
resist it, and if it is possible is it economically and 
politically justifiable. The impossibility of successfully 
deterring all potential aggressors especially for a small 
state means that the steps are generally a compromise 
solution. This is especially the case when there is no 
obvious threat or when the only apparent threat is so 
great as to be undeterrable. 
Probably the main reason for maintaining a military 
capability is tradition. This would certainly be the case 
in New Zealand. Where an army, navy and air force has 
existed for some time and a base force of skilled person-
nel exist, the policy of any Government is likely to be 
one of retaining this capability, but in a very limited 
way. There has been no country in the world who has 
willingly disbanded its armed forces in the past thirty 
years. Yet the situation has changed dramatically for 
many of these countries including New Zealand. Once a 
country possesses a military capability it tends to 
retain one although in many cases, especially where the 
level of direct threat is low, the size of the armed 
forces bears no relation to the size of any possible 
threat. 
For these reasons, the state of the armed forces in 
New Zealand during the past fifteen years and the indic-
ations of the future levels, will not be looked at as 
14 
indicative of peculiar New Zealand policies. They will 
be analysed with these points in mind. The traditional 
ex tence of a military capability, the existence of no 
direct threat, and the impossibility of deterring all 
potential threats whatever the expenditure on defence, 
are all factors that must be accepted in any study of 
New Zealand defence policies. 
These then are the aims, and the level of analysis 
that will be adopted in this study of the New Zealand 
defence situation, particularly as it existed during the 
late sixties and the seventies, but also in so far as 
the developments during this period have affected the 
future development and' structure of the New Zealand 
armed forces. 
15 
CHAPTER II 
THE ALLIANCE ROLE 
One of the most significant aspects of New Zealand's 
defence situation during the period 1965 to 1980 has been 
the role of our allies and the importance of our alliances. 
In common with any small state that wishes to provide 
efficiently for its defence, New Zealand has had to become 
particularly reliant on assistance from allies and most 
especially from a major power, l.n this case the United 
States. While not a desirable situation, it is becoming 
increasingly necessary. 
Whatever the reasons and despite the dangers 'both 
internal and external of becoming very dependent 
militarily on a major power nearly everyone of 
the weaker countries is in some ways tied milit-
arily to at least one of the major powers. 1 
New Zealand is no exception. Even if New Zealand diverted 
much more of her GNP to defence purposes we still would 
not be able to provide a force capable of providing a 
suitable deterrent to attack. It costs no less to defend 
a poor country than it does a rich country. No less to 
defend a sparsely populated country than a densely populated 
country, and no less to defend a small country than a large 
country_ In actual fact the lack of population and size 
probably make New Zealand more difficult to defend especially 
with our long shoreline and vast ocean area. If New Zealand 
wishes to provide for its defence its only valid option 
IMarshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: 
The Dynamics of International Relations (New York : The 
Free Press, 1972), p. 275. 
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is either a collective security agreement with other such 
countries or else an alliance with a major power. 
This chapter/will look at the alliances to which 
New Zealand belongs and the various commitments and oblig-
ations contained there within. It will look especially at 
the requirements needed to maintain a credible membership 
in each and determine whether New Zealand's armed forces 
actually meet these requirements. Any changes in the 
alliance situation during this period will be discussed 
along with possible causes. The objective basically is to 
see how important the alliance role of the armed forces 
is in relation to their other roles and in relation to 
New Zealand's needs. 
The basis for this analysis will be a study of 
official perceptions and statements as contained in news-
paper releases and in official publications such as the 
annual Defence Report and the periodic Defence Reviews. 
An analysis of the types of equipment purchased during 
this period will also shed some light on the official prior-
ities and strategies in relation to alliance factors. 
The three alliances in question here are the Aust-
ralia, New Zealand, United States alliance (ANZUS), the 
South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Five 
Power Defence Arrangements. Looking at each of these in 
turn, ANZUS is a multi-lateral security treaty between 
New Zealand, Australia and the United States. It was 
signed in San Francisco in 1951 as part of a system of 
interlocked security treaties related to the Japanese peace 
treaty. Other parts of the system included a mutual defence 
17 
treaty between the Philippines and the United States, and 
a security treaty between Japan and the United States. The 
treaty imposes obligations such as the obligation under 
article II: for the parties lito maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity of self defence,~and 
the obligation under article III; lito consult whenever in 
the opinion of any party there is a threat to the political 
independence or security of any of the parties. 1I3 Articles 
IV and V contain the obligation to .. act .to meet the common 
danger in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific area 
4 
on any party." Despite these obligations there is no 
criteria set down concerning exactly what steps each 
country should take in its own defence, nor is there any 
specific point prescribed at which one country should 
come to the aid of its allies. 
SEATO was similar to ANZUS ln that members were 
required to "separate1y and jointly, by means of continuous 
and effective self help and mutual aid maintain and develop 
their individual and collective capacity to resist armed 
attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities 
directed from without against their territorial integrity 
and political st~bi1ity.5 Again there was no specific 
obligation to attain a specific level of defence capabilit-
ies nor an obligation to come to the aid of a threatened 
member. Members were merely required to consult to conside 
.G. Stark, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne : 
Melbourne University Press, 1965), p. 69. 
3Ibid • 
4Ibid • 
5The SEATO Treaty. 
th ·t t· 6 e Sl ua lon. 
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SEATO has been virtually defunct as an alliance sine 
1977 with the specifically military aspects being down 
graded since 1974. The Manila Pact still remains in 
existence. Originally SEATO consisted of New Zealand, 
Australia, France, Pakistan (until 1973), the Philippines, 
Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, along 
with three protocol states, Cambodia, Laos and South Viet-
nam. 
The Five Power Defence Arrangements involve New 
Zealand, Australia and Britain in the protection of Malaysi 
and Singapore. They replaced in 1971 the earlier Australia 
New Zealand and Malayian agreement (ANZAM). These state 
that "in the event of any externally organised or supported 
armed attack or threat of attack against Malaysia or Singa-
pore, the five governments would consult together for the 
purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly 
7 
or separately." 
This alliance differs from the others in that it doe: 
not contain the deterrent power consistent with American 
membership but ,rather relies on the collective security of 
several countries headed by the far ,distant Britain. Also 
it is not a collective agreement providing for the security 
of all members. It is a means of Britain, New Zealand and 
Australia reaffirming their support for Malaysia and Singa-
pore. Like the other two, it does not directly oblige any 
member to commit themselves in the event of an attack on 
The SEATO Treaty. 
7The Military Balance 1977-78, p. 55. 
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Malaysia or Singapore. They are merely obliged to discuss 
the situation. There is also no specific defence level 
that Malaysia and Singapore should reach to assist in their 
own defence, nor any capabilities that must be maintained 
by their protectors Britain, New Zealand and Australia. 
The question to be answered is, what is required of 
the New Zealand armed forces if New Zealand wishes to 
remain to be seen as a credible member of these alliances? 
Is there any specific requirement seen as essential by 
the other members, and by the New Zealand Government, and 
how far do the armed forces go in attaining this require-
ment? 
The alliances themselves do not contain any specific 
requirements but is possible to distinguish a minimum 
level of capability necessary to remain as a credible 
contributer to each alliance. An important requirement 
would be that the members including New Zealand show a 
willingness to become involved when the situation warrants 
it. New Zealand has shown this willingness on two occas-
ions. The first was in relation to the Malaysian problem 
in the early fif when New Zealand troops made up part 
of the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. This 
situation occurr~d before the 1965-1980 period, but the 
consequences remained throughout the period, and to this 
day New Zealand troops remain in Singapore. This involve-
ment occurred originally under the auspices of ANZAM and 
a r 1971 came under the Five Power Defence Arrangements. 
In 19.71 Britain withdrew its forces from South East Asia 
leaving A.ustralia and New Zealand to eicept a greater 
i" 
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responsibility in the region. All Australian troops and 
most New ~ealand personnel have also now withdrawn from 
-==--
Malaysia and Singapore. 
The other occasion on which New Zealand has proved 
willing to become involved in support of its allies was in 
Vietnam in the sixties. Here New Zealand troops fought 
alongside their American and Australian allies in support 
of the government of South Vietnam. However 
the decision by each government to commit 
forces in 1965 was unquestionably taken in 
furtherance of SEATO obligations. 8 
South Vietnam was, of course, a protocol member of SEATO. 
The decision was discussed at both SEATO and ANZUS meetings 
and it must be considered that New Zealand's involvement 
also had much to do with our membership of ANZUS. All 
three ANZUS me,mbers fought in Vietnam whereas many SEATO 
members did not. During the Vietnam war New Zealand was 
represented by artillery and infantry units from 1964 
until 1971. Some training units remained after this but 
they were recalled in 1972 after the Labour Party carne to 
power in New Zealand. At the height of our involvement 
in South East Asia in 1968 New Zealand personnel in the 
9 
area totalled 1,344. 
These have been the two occasions on which New 
Zealand has openly come out in supPdrt of our alliance 
obligations, although on both occasions they represented 
only a very small percentage of the total forces involved 
and Robert Burnett, The Australia and New Zealand 
Nexus (Canberra Institute of International Affairs, 1978), 
p. 
9Report of the Ministry of Defence; 1968, p. 5. 
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in the actions. As well as showing a willingness to 
support our allies in times of crisis New Zealand must also 
show a willingness to maintain her armed forces in a state 
of readiness and with suitable equipment in case any need 
for their commitment occurs ln the future. In Vietnam 
New Zealand relied entirely on the United States and to a 
lesser extent Australia for all logistical support as well 
as for much of their eq~ipment. The situation was similar 
in Malaysia. New Zealand will obviously never be able to 
provide fully for its logistical requirements and in fact 
the force is designed to fit into our allies fo~ces as an 
integrated part, rather than a completely independent 
national unit, in the event of another Vietnam situation. 
Despite this, however, New Zealand is expected to maintain 
some credible force as part of its overall aliiance commit-
ments. 
Just recently President Carter has "called on the 
United States' allies in Europe, Asia and the Pacific to 
join with us in increasing their defence efforts."lO 
The Australia response has been to announce a 13,000 strong 
increase in the size of their armed forces and an additional 
$1,360M spending on defence in the next five years.ll Thus 
taking the defence budget to 3 per cent of the GNP in 
comparison with New Zealand's 1.7 per cent. They have also 
announced the deployment of the aircraft carrier 'Melbourne' 
along with an accompanying task force, to the Indian Ocean. 
New Zealand's response has been merely to announce the 
Press, Thursday 31 January, 1980. 
Press, 26 March 1980. 
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implementation of various projects outlined in the Defence 
Review, and to provide naval and air support "as resources 
permit. ,,12 This is fairly indicative of New Zealand's 
attitude throughout the period 1965-1980. On the one hand 
sentiments such as "for the alliance to be worthy of the 
trust we repose in it we must be ready to contribute our 
13 
share," are expressed j While on the other hand no concrete 
efforts are made to ensure New Zealand is capable of play-
ing a significant part in either ANZUS or the other alliances. 
To be capable of a credible response to any reas-
onable alliance commitments New Zealand would require 
greater levels of equipment and more up to date equipment, 
such as aircraft, ships, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft 
missiles and so on. This would not necessarily involve 
massive expenditure, but rather a steady expenditure over 
time, until New Zealand had acquired a minimal level of 
suitable response capabilities. At present New Zealand's 
abili ty to respond to any alliance duty must be considered 
extremely limited. 
As a result of President Nixon's Guam doctrine in 
1969, which initiated a retreat,from forward defence by the 
Americans, New Zealand and Australia have been required to 
accept more responsibility for their security in the South 
Pacific and in the Asian Pacific region. This need was also 
brought on by the British withdrawal from South East Asia 
in 1971. New Zealand's total involvement in this area con-
sists of the battalion in Singapore, and Mr Muldoon himself 
tchurch Star, Thursday, 28 February 1980. 
l3Defence Review, 19"78, p. 16. 
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said "the ch f advantage of maintaining the New Zealand 
battalion in Singapore is the effect it has on recruitment 
14 for the army," also there is no suitable accommodation 
for the troops in New Zealand~ The surveillance activitues 
of the Orions and frigates which these days are increasingly 
concerned with New Zealand's own exclusive two hundred mile 
zone~ And the limited troops and equipment present in New 
! 
Zealand, which could be flown in limited numbers to any 
minor trouble spot in the South Pacific. 
Despite the restricted nature of New Zealand's 
alliance capabilities President Carter has stated "how 
valuable we consider the relationship to be between our 
nation and New Zealand and Australia. ,,15 He said "there 
could not be a stronger friendship and alliance or partner-
ship in facing rapidly changing circumstances than that 
between the United States and Australia and New Zealand." 16 
This is inspite of the fact that New Zealand has at times 
actually seemed to go against the aims of ANZUS. An example 
of this was :rtr.he Labour Government's desire to create a 
'nuclear free zone' in the South Pacific. A draft resolu-
tion was submitted to the United Nations in 1975, which 
17 Australia supported to some extent but did not co-sponsor. 
A nuclear free zone would in effect banish all American 
ships from the South Pacific since the United States do 
not reveal which ships are nuclear armed. The Australian 
Defence Department said that "New Zealand's efforts to pro-
ristchurch Star 7 September 1976. 
istchurch Star, 28 February 1980. 
Ibid. 
17Alan and Robert Burnett, op cit., p. 267. 
mote a nuclear fr~e,zone in the South Pacific are detriment 
L~ 
to Australia'a security interests. The united States has 
recently made clear its objections to the nuclear free zone 
proposal and its dissatisfaction that an ANZUS ally should 
persist in a course which the united States has declared 
harmful to its interests .... there are some New Zealand 
attitudes on defence matters which impose some limits to 
the co-operation between Australia and New Zealand on 
18 
strategic and defence matters." This occurred under the 
Labour Government and when the National Party retunned 
to power soon after they reaffirmed their approach to 
ANZUS: 
We fully accept that membership of the ANZUS 
Alliance entails both rights and obligations. 
Unlike the previous Government we consider the 
idea of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific 
to be not only impracticable in today's world, 
but unrealistic insofar as it could hinder the 
provision of the defence assistance upon which 
we would depend in a major emergency. 19 
There is no doubting the desire particularly on 
the part of a National Government to remain under the 
protection of the United States. What does remain doubt-
ful is the extent to which. they are prepared to assist in 
their own protection. It is interesting in this respect 
to compare figures of defence spending for all members of 
the alliances to which New Zealand belongs. (See Table 2.1 
These figures deal with 1971, a time when British 
and American involvement in South East Asia was ending. 
It was also a time almost in the middle of the 1965-1980 
18sydney Bulletin, 12 June 1976, p. 5. 
19 Report of the Ministry of Defence 1976, p. 5. 
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TABLE 2.1 
Defence Spending for the Year 1971 
Country $ Millions $ Per Head % GNP No. 
Armed 
Forces 
Pakistan 714 14 4.2 395,000 
Thailand 260 7 3.9 150,000 
Philippines .136 3 1.8 31,000 
France 5,202 101 3.1 500,000 
United States 78,742 378 7.3 2,391,000 
New Zealand 124 43 1.7 12,637 
Australia 1,261 97 2.9 88,110 
United Kingdom 6,108 109 4.7 372,331 
Singapore 158 73 6.3 17,100 
Malaysia 186 17 4.3 50,500 
period. The general rankings remain the same today. 
Countries such as the United States and Britain of course 
only had a very small proportion of their forces in the 
Asian Pacific region at any time and France had no represent-
ation. What is immediately apparent is that New Zealand's 
spends the least on defence and as a consequence has the 
smallest armed forces. As a percentage of Government 
spending New Zealand's defence budget is also the smallest. 
The actual size of the armed forces would not matter greatly 
if they were equipped with modern, sophisticated weapons 
but this is not the case in New Zealand. 
How far is New Zealand capable of contributing to 
these alliances? This refers primarily to ANZUS but the 
Five Power Arrangements are also still important, and the 
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Manila Pact stil) exists, although not in its original 
mili,tary sense. New Zealand has proved in the past capable 
of contributing to the Five Power arrangements or to be 
more precise ANZAM. This contribution was however limited 
and only useful as a small part of the total contribution. 
Today New Zealand's contribution could not hope to equal 
that of any other membel(s~iJ Its only advantage would be 
that New Zealand troops would be able to respond to any 
emergency more quickly than British forces if there was a 
sudden crisis. Most probably though there would be con-
sultations and warning beforehand and even this advantage 
would disappear. The presence in Singapore, while more 
than either Britain or Australia provide, is totally insign-
ificant in the overall scheme of things. Even the likeli-
hood of New Zealahd wishing to become involved in any 
crisis in Malaysia or Singapore must be questionable. This 
particularly relates to trouble resulting from internal 
problems, but could also refer to external intervention. 
The Australian view that "we do not expect or want our 
forces to be engaged in any activi there of local 
origin. If it were a matter of people coming in from out-
side or an obviously outside-inspired movement, then the 
case might be different although after Vietnam one could 
20 
not be sure. II New Zealand is therefore incapable 
making any significant contribution to the Five Power 
arrangements apart from training troops from Malaysia or 
Singapore and contributing to exercises and so on. Through-
out the period 1965-1980 therefore the armed forces role in 
Changing Face of Defence, II The Listener, 29 May 1972, 
p. 7. 
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relation to the Five Power arrangements has declined although 
this pattern is similar to the other allies as well, since 
the situation in the area has improved to a s'tage where 
further unrest appears unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
Along with this though it must be accepted that New Zealand 
is less capable today of contributing to this alliance than 
we were in the fifties and sixties. 
SEATO is less significant now than earlier in this 
period, and there would be no obligation for New Zealand 
I( to aid a fellow member of SEATO. There are no longer SEATO 
exercises nor a combined planning and decision-making body 
so the strategic signi,ficance of SEATO is unimportant. New 
Zealand's armed forces role in conjunction with SEATO has 
therefore declined as has their ability to conduct such a 
role. 
The most important alliance role of the New Zealand 
armed forces is in relation to ANZUS. This is a two-sided 
role. On the one hand, it is very important, since our 
membership of ANZUS and our apparent contribution to it 
provides New Zealand with its chief source of protection 
from any outside threat. On the other hand, it may be 
less significant to the actual operations of the armed 
forces, since the effort devoted specifically to the alli-
ance role is limited. The equipment purchased during this 
period has not been of the type specifically required for 
alliance duties ,although New Zealand does not have limited 
resources of the type needed to play a viable part in the 
on-going aspects of our alliance role. These include an 
anti-submarine capability provided by the frigates, especially 
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Canterbury and Waikato, a surveillance capability pro'vided 
partly by the frigates, and more specifically by the Orions 
and a support capability for United States ships operating 
in the South Pacific. This is no where near as well 
developed as the harbour facilities provided by the Aust-
ralians and which are being improved further. Australia 
also provides the United States with the Pine Gap communic-
ations centre in the Australian North West Cape. There is 
no equivalent United States establishment in New Zealand. 
Where New Zealand lacks the resources to contribute 
adequately to the ANZUS alliance, is in the event of an out-
break of hostilities against any of the members, including 
New Zealand. New Zealand's effective counter measures for 
an invasion against any party are very restricted. They 
amount to short range, almost obsolete fighters, two frigates 
for a massive area of coast line and ocean, eventually, 
limited capability, light weight tanks, and troops with a 
restricted array of low firepower'w~epons. While New 
"'-.,~'" 
Zealand is capable of carrying out some functions in sup-
port of ANZUS in times of peace, we are not able to perform 
any significant functions in times of hostilities. 
The important thing is that realistically New Zea-
land could not be expected to play any significant part in 
a major conflict. An increase in defence spending would 
eventually increase our capacity to take part in surveill-
ance duties and so on, but it would be virtually imposs-
ible for New Zealand to develop the resources required to 
playa major part in most hostilities. What our allies would 
expect and what New Zealand often does nbt undertake is a 
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development of the capabilities we possess at present. 
This would on the one hand provide a functional service 
both for New ~erland and the alliance, and also create a 
(" 
force, albeit1a token one is some respects, that would 
justify us retaining membership of ANZUS and the protec-
tion of the United states. 
The alliance role of the armed forces is crucial to 
New Zealand, not so much in itself, but rather because of 
the advantages it obtains for New Zealand. It is a diff-
icult role to develop and co-ordinate since it may seem 
insignificant in the immediate sense, however in the long 
run it should continue to provide security and play an 
increasingly important part in New Zealand foreign policy 
and defence policy. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TERRITORIAL ROLE . 
Any country in the world is primarily concerned with 
protecting itself against intrusions from outside. These 
intrusions usually come in either an economic or a military 
sense. Economic threats can not always be diverted but 
military threats can be diverted if suitable precautions 
are taken. rrhe method adopted by many countries to guard 
against aggression is by forming alliances as was seen in 
the previous chapter. This is, however, a secondary approach 
which attempts to deal with a problem not directly but in 
a round about sense. The only direct way of preventing 
aggression is to physically stop it, by developing a strong 
self-defence force. This is of course difficult for countries 
that do not have a massive GNP, and even if a complete 
defence against conventional attack is developed there is 
still the chance that a nuclear threat may develop. Terr-
itorial defence therefore creates a particular problem for 
nations especially small states. Th~y must decide just how 
far to develop this particular resource and what methods to 
use. These decisions are influenced by the degree of potent-
ial threat and the special characteristics of the country 
involved, such as economic considerations, geographical 
factors and political factors. 
New Zealand is one of many nations that cannot com-
pletely protect itself from aggression, due to economic 
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factors such as an inadequate GNP, geographical factors, a 
very long coast line, and political factors - no obvious 
threat, therefore a reluctance to devote resources for this 
purpose. This chapter will look at the extent to which the 
New Zealand armed forces are used in a territorial defence 
role, what reasons they possess for this role and whether 
this role has developed or declined during the period 1965-
1980. The basis for th analysis will come from a study 
of official statements in Defence Reviews and Reports and 
so on and from the equipment used by and purchased by the 
armed forces during this period. There will be some overlap 
in parts between territorial and alliance related operations 
and duties but this should not be too restrictive in the 
overall analysis. 
The best way of approaching this subject is by first 
of all determining what would be required to adequately pro-
tect New Zealand and then seeing just how far the armed 
forces go in providing these capabilities. New Zealand of 
course cannot completeli protect herself but some viable 
level of territorial defence capabilities should be defined. 
Other roles such as the regional role and most especially 
the alliance role contribute to New Zealand's overall 
territorial defence, but in the last respect any nation's 
security comes down to its own ability to defend itself. 
Very briefly, a nation's ability to defend itself can 
be determined by its ability to provide the following capa-
bilities: 
(1) An advance warning system, comprising both shore 
based radar and reconnaissance aircraft; 
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(2) An air defence capability comprising both land 
and sea based surface to air missiles and all weather inter-
cepter aircraft; 
(3) An anti-aircraft capability comprising surface 
to surface missiles, and also an anti-submarine capability; 
(4) An army equipped with anti-tank and anti-
personnel weapons as well as suitable transport facilities. 
These would be the minimum requirements needed to 
deter any aggression. The need is of course to deter any 
aggressor rather than actually be capable of defeating 
them. 
No small state can in itself constitute a major 
target of great'power policy but only one which is 
secondary to a more important object. If the price 
of exercising military pressure against it can be 
raised high enough,' other, less costly means of 
achieving the major object will be preferred. 1 
Forming alliances with larger powers is usually used as a 
method of deterrence, but ultimately it comes down to a 
nation's own self-defence capability. 
Potential aggressors are hard to find in New Zealand's 
case. The Defence Review does not foresee any potential 
threat to New Zealand, but says that if a threat was to 
eventuate it would result from a "shift in the balance of 
forces in the Pacific Basin.,,2 Without elaborating, it 
is hard to envisage just who might be expected to threaten 
New Zealand. The two possibilities are a major power, such 
as China or the Soviet Union, or a smaller nation, such as 
Indonesia. While many Asian Pacific nations possess superior 
David Vital, The Tnequali'tyof States: A Study of the 
Small Power in Tn'ternational 'Relati'ons (Oxford: Clarendon, 
Press, 1967), p. 153. 
2Defence Review, 1978, p. 14. 
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military numbers and equipment to New Zealand it should be 
remembered that to have any chance of success an invading 
force would generally need to be three to four times the 
size of that of the defenders. This would tend to rule 
out serious threats from any of the smaller nations. 
The assumption is that any attack on New Zealand 
will be conventional in nature, since a nuclear threat 
could not adequately be deterred anyhow. In the event of 
a conventional attack it can be assumed that large numbers 
of men with massive support facilities would be needed to 
threaten a defended New Zealand and that these forces 
would be required to cross vast expanses of ocean. In the 
second world war 
it took 200 ships - many of them large - to land 
20,000 men of the 7th Division in Borneo - and 
1,700 to put ashore the D,S. invasion force of 
250,000 in the Philippines. 3 
This shows the magnitude of such a task. It now remains 
to be seen what the New Zealand armed forces are doing to 
ensure any such invasion would be suitably contested. 
This will be done by looking at each of the four basic 
requirements in turn, to see how far they are fulfilled 
by the New Zealand armed forces. 
The first of the four is a forward warning system 
of both shore based radar and reconnaissance aircraft. In 
New Zealand's case this consists mainly of the airforce 
Orions which provide a limited reconnaissance capability. 
The Defence Review states that the Air Force needs to 
retain the capability to detect, identify and report 
Teichmann (ed.), Aspects of Australia's Defence 
(Melbourne: The Political Studies Association, Monash Uni-
versity, 1966), p. 69. 
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surface and sub-surface activities throughout the maritime 
areas of direct interest.,,4 With the increased restric-
tions of flying hours, introduced as a fuel saving measure 
in the mid seventies, and the predominant use of the Orions 
for Search and Rescue and resource protection duties, their 
capability for reconnaissance is limited. Also there are 
1 f ' P 3B 0' 5 d t t' th on y lve - rl0ns an a anyone lme no more an 
three are likely to be in the air. Therefore, their 
ability to provide New Zealand with up to date information 
concerning movements in the area of interest must be 
questionable. 
The other reqpirement, a radar capacity, to detect 
airbourne and also surface acti vi ty throughout the area" 
is completely lacking. New Zealand has no early warning 
system of its own and relies completely on information 
provided by allies from satellite and surface observations. 
It also relies on the assumption that any attack on New 
Zealand will be preceded by a lengthy build~up of forces 
and a long sea voyage which would hopefully again be 
spotted at an early stage by our allies. As far as this 
first desired capability for territorial defence is con-
cerned, therefore, New Zealand fal'ls well behind the 
required levels. 
The second requirement to be considered is an anti-
aircraft capability. Any attack would most probably be 
spearheaded by a two-fold air operation. One, an air 
strike on vital defence installations, and two, an airlift 
of troops to make the initial assault. It is therefore 
Defence Review, 1978, p. 37. 
SMilitary Balance 1979-1980, p. 70. 
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necessary to have some defence against a threat from this 
source. To what extent is this provided for by the armed 
forces? 
New Zealand has no land-based anti-aircraft capab-
ility at all. This is in contrast to Australia who has 
only recently taken delivery of a further 12 rapier SAMs 
(Surface to Air Missiles) and 10 blindfire AD (Air Defence) 
6 
radar. Previously they had 8 rapier SAMs~' The New 
Zealand frigates are all equipped with SAMs, however they 
could hardly be used as flak ships. The Skyhawks are 
equipped with an air to air capability, but they are not 
designed for this type of role, being primarily ground 
support aircraft. Their chances of surviving even limited 
combat with any enemy aircraft would be minimal. New 
Zealand has no true all weather intercepter aircraft nor 
does it have any other significant anti-aircraft capabi-
lity. This crucial capability of any territorial defence 
force is therefore almost completely lacking amongst the 
New Zealand armed forces. 
The third criteria 1S an anti-shipping and anti-
submarine capability. This is usually provided by both 
an air and sea capability. As far as air defence against 
shipping and submarines is concerned New Zealand is reason-
ably well equipped. The Orions can seek out and destroy 
submarines while the Skyhawks are able to operate against 
shipping and can carry air to surface missiles. The 
problem is that these air capabilities may not be approp-
riate in the face of a large scale attack. For one thing 
6Military Balance, 1979-1980, p. 63. 
<' 
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the airfields from which these aircraft operate may well 
have been put out of action before a sea-going target is 
sighted. Also, the New Zealand aircraft would be unable 
to penetrate any air escort provided for shipping. They 
would also be vulnerable to the sophisticated SAMs likely 
to be carried by any naval force. 
New Zealand's sea-going defence against naval 
intruders &s provided solely by the three operational 
frigates. While they are capable of detecting and possibly 
destroying submarines, especially when assisted by air-
craft, the likelihood of three frigates covering the whole 
New Zealand ocean area adequately is remote. Their use-
fulness against well armed and probably numerically 
superior surface forces is limited. They are designed 
primarily for their anti-submarine role and for escort 
purposes not to engage other warships. Therefore, while 
the New Zealand armed forces are to a limited extent able 
to provide this capability, here again they lack the 
essential resources to do the job properly. 
The fourth and last essential requirement for 
territorial defence is an adequate and mobile army. The 
New Zealand army is reasonably mobile. This is provided 
by armoured personnel carriers, trucks and, to a lesser 
extent, helicopters and aircraft such as the Hercules and 
Andovers. They are not, however, capable of deploying in 
strength to any area in New Zealand at short notice. 
Mobility is, of course, only one aspect, the main require-
ment is suitable and plentiful firepower. It is rather 
pointless being able to rush troops to a danger spot if 
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they have not got any suitable weapons to take with them. 
In New Zealand's case fire power consists primarily of 
light to medium artillery and small arms capabilities. 
There will, of course, be the addition of the scorpion 
light tank in the near future. Its value, however, would 
be restricted to operations against poorly equipped 
infantry, since it could not possibly engage other tanks, 
nor could it survive any confrontation against infantry 
armed with anti-tank weapons. This again contrasts with 
the Australians who possess the Redeye anti-tank system, 
as well as over lOO Leopard medium tanks. Without the 
light and mobile anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons 
designed for use by the individual infantryman, the overall 
effectiveness of the New Zealand army is very limited in 
the event of an intrusion in force against New Zealand 
territory. 
As can be seen by looking at each of these four 
required fields of military capability, New Zealand lacks 
the resources to be able to adequately fulfil the role of 
territorial defence. It is possible that a very limited 
threat may be repelled by the existing forces and resources, 
but any threat to New Zealand is likely to be far greater 
than that that could be provided by a country the size of 
say Fiji. It would therefore appear that the territorial 
role is not one which receives a lot of importance or 
effort in so far as equipment is concerned anyway_ The 
important concern now is to determine why this apparent 
lack of concern for the territorial role has developed 
if in fact it has, and to see just hbw this role has 
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changed during the period 1965-1980. 
It has already been accepted that New Zealand 
could not hope to adequately provide for its own territorial 
defence. Neither, for that matter, can Australia or 
virtually any other small country in the world. What is 
important is that some effort be made in this area, for 
two reasons. Firstly it is important in so far as our 
alliance situation is concerned. If an invading power 
completely over-ran New. Zealand in a very quick time and 
with little resistance, then it would be more difficult to 
persuade our allies,_ particularly the United States, to 
become involved. Where a confrontation situation has 
reached an apparent conclusion it is more difficult for 
outside powers to become involved than it would be where 
hostilities are continuing. Therefore it is important for 
New Zealand to be able to delay and resist any aggressor 
for long enough to enable the United States to become 
involved. Another element of this alliance situation, as 
previously mentioned in the chapter dealing with this area, 
is that New Zealand is required by ANZUS lito maintain and 
develop her individual and collective capacity of self-
defence.,,7 If this capability is not developed then our 
allies, Australia and the united States, may decide that 
they are not obliged to assist New Zealand in the event of 
any attack on our territory. 
The second consideration 1S that if some form of 
deterrence can be developed then a potential aggressor may 
decide that the costs of any aggression would be so high 
Stark, TheANZUS Treaty Alliance, p. 69. 
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as to be unacceptable. Even the apparent protection of any 
ally such as the United States is no guarantee that an 
aggressor will not consider the risks worth taking in 
particular circumstances. In actual fact an alliance with 
the United States may well provide a reason for some 
nation opposed to the United States to get at them by 
attacking one of their allies, New Zealand. Some suitable 
type of territorial defence, no matter how totally effect-
ive, is therefore essential for any small state. 
This factor has apparently been accepted by the 
Governments throughout this period, at least in so far as 
their stated aims in the Defence Reviews are concerned. 
The first objective in the 1966 Defence Review was to 
"preserve the security national interests and independence 
of New Zealand and the island territories for which it is 
responsible. ,,8 However, in the later section concerning 
the missions of the armed forces there was no specified 
desire to become directly capable of defending New Zealand 
territory. The nearest any desire came to this was 
"contributing to the protection of sea and air communica-
tions vital to New Zealand.,,9 
The 1972 Review was similar to this and in 1978 the 
objection still remained similar, the 
preservation of the security and integrity of 
New Zealand itself: our land, our air space, our 
12 mile territorial sea and our newly established 
200 mile exclusive economic zone. 10 
8Defence Review, 
9Ibid ., p. 6. 
10D f . e ence Revlew, 
1966, p. 5 
1978, p. 15. 
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The acceptance of this policy objective was said to impose 
the following general requirement 
The provision of forces capable of quick response 
to any threat to New Zealand itself, of controll-
ing the adjacent economic zone, and at the same 
time of upholding New Zealand's wider national 
interests in our area of prime concern - the New 
Zealand region and the South Pacific. 11 
The desire to contribute to territorial defence, 
however vague was apparent in the Reviews. As has been 
seen above this desire has not been translated into the 
required capabilities. New Zealand is barely capable of 
detecting and arresting fishing boats operating illegally 
in our waters, let alone being capable of quick response 
to any threat to New Zealand itself. During this period 
no equipment purchases have really had any major effect on 
this capability. The frigates, Skyhawks and the proposed 
tanks, all contribute to some small degree to territorial 
defence, but there has been no integrated and co-ordinated 
development of specific territorial defence capability. 
The ability to carry out this role may well have even 
declined during this period; if the increasingly sophis-
ticated weapons possessed by our potential enemies are 
considered. 
One of the reasons for the apparent decline in the 
capability to carry out this role has been the increased 
complexity and expense of modern military equipment. It 
would be necessary for a country to modernise its defence 
capabilities every time its enemies developed further 
their offensive capabilities. Whis is obviously not 
fence Review, 1978, p. 15. 
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possible for New Zealand. Also, purely defensive equip-
ment such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons have no 
use in other Ids such as civil operations or even at 
times in alliance or regional operations. 
Another important aspect of the territorial defence 
role is that it should actually have increased in import-
ance, even if this is not acknowledged by apparent prior-
ities. This increase in importance has been brought about 
by the changing defence strategies of the major powers. 
until the beginning of the seventies the United States 
operated a policy of forward defence, best exemplified by 
their presence in Vie~nam. As a consequence of this policy 
American troops and also British troops, because Britain 
also followed this policy in the early days, were stationed 
in the Asian Pacific region, thus providing for New Zea-
land's forward defence as well as their own . With the 
withdrawal of firstly the British presence, which was 
completed by the early seventies, and then the United 
States withdrawal as a consequence of Nixon's 1969 Guam 
Doctrine, which was finalised not long after, New Zealand 
lost her forward defence protection which had been provided 
by these powers. Since then New Zealand has been respons-
ible for her own defence but this has not resulted in any 
extra emphsis being accorded to the territorial defence 
role. 
The only possible conclusion to reach then is that 
whereas our contributions to territorial. de£ence should 
in actual fact have increased during the period 1965-1980, 
given the circumstances existing, they have actually 
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decreased, both as a part of the armed forces total 
duties and in so far as New Zealand's total defence cap-
abilities are concerned. Th situation is perhaps 
understandable, considering New Zealand's economic sit-
uation and the lack of any apparent·threat to our secur-
ity in a military sense. Whereas the Civil Role, Alliance 
Role and Regional Role all have benefits outside their 
direct military purpose, the territorial Defence Role is 
restricted to its purely military purpose and as such can 
appear unattractive to the Government when deciding how 
defence funds should be distributed. 
At no stage has Government policy included a d~sire 
to achieve a certain standard of self-sufficiency in 
defence or at peast provide a significant territorial 
defence force without relying on all The role, whilst 
existing to some extent, is not seen as being significantly 
separate from the regional and alliance roles. While to 
a large extent it is equated with these roles, it should 
be seen as being at least partly separate, since any 
nation needs some form of independent force for its own 
self-protection. 
It must be remembered though that the question of 
territorial defence is a delicate one. It cannot be 
looked at in isolation since New Zealand's primary defence 
strategy 1S one of 'collective security,.12 If New Zea-
land was to achieve the virtually impossible situation of 
complete territorial security then the need for the ANZUS 
alliance would disappear since New Zealand would be in a 
Report of the Ministry of Defence 1968, p. 4. 
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position of armed neutrality. This would make New Zealand 
independent in a military sense and able to deter all 
likely aggressors. This is of course an unlikely situa-
tion since New Zealand does not possess the economic base 
necessary to produce the expensive equipment needed for 
such an option. To maintain a policy of armed neutrality 
New Zealand would need to develop an indigenous defence 
industry, none of which exists today, and also would have 
to achieve a strong external trade situation so that the 
economy would not be subject to pressure from other 
nations. 
It is not possible therefore for New Zealand to ever 
hope to have a satisfactory form of territorial defence. 
If indeed it is possible for any nation whatever its 
size and resources to ensure themselves of completely 
foolproof territorial defence. It is a question therefore 
of achieving a degree of territorial defence suitable for 
the needs of a nation, in this case, New Zealand. 
New Zealand exists in such a situation that the 
provision of territorial defence is difficu~y if not 
impossible. Geographically and economically New Zealand 
would find it hard to adequately fulfil this need. For 
this reason the territorial role, although important 
for the reasons discussed, must be acknowledged as being 
somewhat less significant in the overall defence scene 
than some of the other roles. The alliance role part-
icularly is significantly more important to New Zealand 
than the territorial role. In New Zealand, as in most 
small states, it is by contributing to alliances usually 
involving a major power, rather than by more direct 
measures, that territorial security is best achieved. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REGIONAL ROLE 
New Zealand is a part of several regions, ranging from, 
in the narrowest sense, the South Pacific region to, in a 
broader sense, the South East Asian or Asian Pacific region 
and further afield again, the massive Pacific Basin cornrn-
uni ty. Obvious ly our'sense of belonging to, and identifica-
tion with, each of these regions will vary as we turn from 
the narrowest to the widest sector. New Zealand is primarily 
involved with the more localised South Pacific region. In 
relation to this region we could be described as a large 
fish in a large ocean whereas in relation to the other 
further afield regions we are definitely a somewhat smaller 
fish in a very much larger ocean. 
Our involvement with the South Pacific associates us 
with several vastly different countries, both in a geograph-
ical and cultural sense. Australia is, of course, our 
largest neighbour and our partner in matters concerning the 
South Pacific. Apart from New Zealand and Australia nthe 
islands range from New Guinea with a land area of 975,000 
square kilometres and a population of 3,000,000 to the Toke-
laus, with a total of 'ten square kilometres and a population 
of 1,700."1 Excluding Australia, New Zealand, West Irian, 
and Hawaii, Oceania contains "a population of about 4,000,000 
and a land area of less than 650,000 square kilometres, 
1 . G 
. Ian Wards (ed.), NeW Zealand Atlas (Wellington: overn-
ment Printer, 1976), p. 192. 
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divided amongst several hundred islands scattered over one 
third of the earth's surface. n2 It is therefore a diverse 
and well spread region. It is also a developing region. 
Since the early sixties many of the nation states within 
the region have attained levels of independence. Western 
Samoa in 1962, the Cook Islands, 1965 (internal sel 
government), Nauru, 2968, Fiji and Tonga, 1970, Papua New 
Guinea in 1973 and more recently Tuvalu, Kiributi and 
the Gilbert Islands have all undergone changes in status 
during this period. 
Further afield New Zealand is increasingly concerned 
with the countries of South East Asia. One reason for this 
is the increased importance of these countries to New Zea-
land's trade, especially since the United Kingdom joined 
the EEC in 1·973. Between 1972 and 1977 New Zealand's exports 
to the ASEAN countries increased from $52 million to $129 
"II" 3 ml lon. Also during the period under consideration there 
was major unrest in several South East Asian countries, 
actually involving New Zealand in a war between 1967 and 1971 
in South Vietnam. 
To maintain our position as a dominant part of the 
South Pacific and as a respected neighbour in South East 
Asia, New Zealand obviously needs to have a suitable military 
capability to add some strength to its position. To what 
degree do the New Zealand armed forces fulfil this require-
ment, what has been their role in respect to the South 
Pacific and South East Asia during the period 1965-1980 and 
2wards, op cit., p. 192. 
3New Zealand Yearbook 1978, p. 549. 
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has there been any apparent change in this role? 
In examining this role there will, by necessity, be 
some overlapping with other roles, in particular the alliance 
role and also to some extent the civil role. This is unavoid-
able since such aspects as Vietnam are undeniably important 
to both roles. South East Asia will be examined firstly with 
consideration to both directly military roles and less 
military orientated roles. The South Pacific will then be 
looked at under the same headings. 
The most significant event during this period has been 
the withdrawal of all British and American troops from South 
East Asia, leaving these countries virtually to fend for 
themselves. There are of course no signs of any trouble 
arising nor have there been for some years now, therefore 
there was no reason for these outside troops to remain. 
Without these troops:'though, what is required of the New 
Zealand and also the Australian armed forces in respect 
of their role of providing for the protection of this 
region? For one thing, it should be realised that many of 
the countries in South East Asia possess far more extensive 
military forces than does New Zealand. 4 Therefore the level 
of direct military assistance that New Zealand can provide 
for these countries is limited. 
Our major defence arrangement as far as South East 
Asia is concerned lies in the Five Power arrange-
ment, backed up of course by ANZUS. SEATO is 
now much less meaningful. 5 
As far as these agreements are concerned New Zealand is 
4Refer to Table 2.1. 
5"Th~ Changing Face of Defence in New Zealand,"The 
Listener, 29 May 1972,p. 7. 
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responsible to some extent for corning to the aid of our 
neighbours should we decide it is required. 6 During the 
period 1965-1980 New Zealand has corne to the aid of, or 
already been aiding, two separate South East Asian countries. 
Since the fifties New Zealand has maintained a military 
presence in Malaysia and from 1967 to 1971 maintained a 
presence in South Vietnam. As far as the requirements of 
these aspects of the regional role were' concerned, all New 
Zealand· had to provide was troops and a limited amount of 
equipment, the major pieces of equipment and all logistical 
support were provided by our allies, the United States, the 
United Kingdom and to a lesser extent, Australia. These 
days with the withdrawal of the United States and Britain 
and the improved military position of many of the South 
East Asian countries the regional requirements have changed. 
New Zealand in a military sense and in very simple terms 
requires the following capabilities if it wishes to make a 
significant, if limited, contribution to regional security: 
(1) medium range air and naval transport capabilities 
and .associated escort facilities, 
(2) medium range naval and air force, strike and 
interception capabilities, 
(3) some degree of commonality of equipment with 
allies. Also familiarity with allies' . operating procedures 
and equipment, 
(4) suitable equipment such as easily transportable 
anti-aircraft" anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons, and 
(5) considerable logislticalsupport for troops 
operating many miles from their horne base. 
6 Refer to p. 17. 
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As far as these requirements are concerned New Zea-
land is only partly capable of contributing to regional 
security in a solely military capacity. While we possess 
limited transport capabili es we do not possess suitable 
escort capabilities. For example, the range limitations 
of the Skyhawks would prevent them from escorting Hercules 
or Andovers. At sea the frigates provide an escort cap-
ability but there are no ships to escort, therefore they 
have to carry troops themselves, which restricts their own 
operations and would not involve many troops anyway_ New 
Zealand also possesses no medium to long-range air force 
interception capabili and has limited naval capabilities 
for this role. The degree of commonality of equipment is 
not great. For instance, New Zealand operates A-4K Skyhawk 
fighters, Australia F-lllC's and Mirages, Singapore Hunter 
FGA74's, Indonesia CA-27 Avon Sabres and so on. 7 The only 
country with any aircraft similar to New Zealand's is 
Singapore who operates Skyhawks amongst their other types. 
Also, while SEATO exercises used to provide opportunities to 
train wi.th. other armed forces, these opportunities are now 
limited. Lastly, the New Zealand armed forces possess virt-
ually no suitable equipment or logistical support. They 
would be totally reliant on Australia and any other countries 
involved and they would be unlikely to be able to cater to 
all of New Zealand's needs. 
It is therefore apparent that New Zealand's regional 
role is not particularly. centred on providing direct military 
assistance, in relation to South East Asia. R~ther the role 
7The Mili.tary Balance 1979-1980, pp. 63-72. 
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of the New Zealand armed forces in relation to this region 
is centred on the provision of other forms of assistance. 
Since these countries often have greater military capabil 
ties than does New Zealand, our armed forces contribute to 
Government foreign policy by providing such things as 
specialised training for military personnel from these 
countries and exercising with some of these nations. During 
1977 personnel from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and 
Thailand all received training from New Zealand instructors, 
while Malaysia and Singapore also took part in exercises in 
New zealand. 8 
There is also a great deal of other work carried out 
by New Zealand military personnel throughout South East 
Asia. This usually involves civil tasks such as disaster 
relief or engineering operations, etc. In developing 
countries there are often no resources available to con-
struct roads as New Zealand engineers did in Thailand9 or to 
clean up after cyclones or hurricanes, floods or earth-
quakes and so on, all of which New Zealand military personnel 
have had to contend with during this period. This type of 
operation benefits New Zealand foreign policy and our 
relations with these countries in South East Asia as much 
as would the presence of a large New Zealand military. 
Up until now discussion has focused on the New Zealand 
military's role in relation to South East Asia. This is 
just one area of regional involvement and probably a more 
significant area concerns their involvement in the South 
Report of the Ministry of Defence 1978, pp. 6-7. 
9Report of the Ministry of Defence 1969, p. 18. 
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Pacific, a region far closer to New Zealand and one contain-
ing more dependent nations. 
Whereas the military's involvement in South East Asia 
is relatively insignificant in a strategic sense, the value 
of the New Zealand and Australian military presence is 
much more significant to the nations of the South Pacific. 
None of the small states in the South Pacific possess an 
adequate military force of their own and they all rely 
almost totally on outside assistance especially from New 
Zealand and Australia in the immediate term. The military's 
involvement in the South Pacific takes two approaches. 
Firstly the direct military assistance and protection role 
and secondly the training and civil assistance role. The 
first role, direct military protection for the area, is not 
manifest ln a continuous military presence. in the region, 
at least not a land based presence, anyway, .but is rather 
based on the assumption that should any threat occur to an 
island state such as Tonga or Fiji, then New Zealand along 
with Australia would act to meet it. New Zealand therefore 
sees itself as a protector of the South Pacific states, and 
in the unlikely event that some threat should occur to them, 
would be able to do more to assist than they would if a South 
EaJt Asian state was threatened. 
Where New Zealand military involvement in the South 
Pacific is most apparent is in the less militarily orient-
ated roles of disaster relief and so on. The New Zealand 
armed forces are almost continuously involved in either 
emergency operations or on-going civil assistance operations 
in the South Pacific. The most recent example of the former 
Ii.· 
has been Cyclone Wally which struc/ Fiji on April 4:t:h 1980 
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causing massive devastation. Air Force Hercules from New 
Zealand were dispatched with helicopters, equipment and 
10 personnel. This is just one example of a string of such 
operations throughout the period 1965 to 1980. An example 
of the on-going type of operations conducted as part of 
the Governments bilateral aid plan has been the sur:il.reying of 
harbours in Tonga. ll Perhaps the best description of the 
armed forces involvement in the South Pacific is contained 
in the 1978 Defence Review which says 
They enable us to give the island states of the 
Pacific help of a kind they want when they want 
it. 12 
This has been a d~scription of the requirements 
involved in providing different forms of assistance to both 
the South Pacific and South East Asian region, and the 
actual role played by the New Zealand armed forces in this 
region. The objective now is to determine whether the 
overall involvement of the armed forces in these regional 
roles has changed significantly during this period and if so 
why such a change has occurred. 
In terms of actual numbers and type of operations 
involved, it would appear that the regional role has declined 
during the period. In the late sixties and early seventies 
New Zealand troops were actively involved in the Vietnam war, 
prior to this they had been concerned with the situation in 
Malaysia. Today the only remnants of this concern for South 
East Asia would be the battalion stationed in Singapore. 
10New Zealand Herald, Monday, 7 April 1980. 
llReport of the Ministry of Defence 1978, p. 13. 
12Defence Review 1978, p. 7. 
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The significance of this battalion to present day New 
Zealand defence strategy can not be said to be overly import-
ant. Also there has been no significant stepping up of the 
more civil orientated operations such as emergency services. 
Therefore it would seem, without doubt, that the regional 
role of the armed forces has been declining significantly 
throughout the seventies. Also the reasons for this 
decline would appear to be quite obvious, in that they stem 
from the changes in the international situation as it per-
tains to this area of the wor:ild. There is I?o longer a 
disruptive conflict occurring in the area, there has been 
a withdrawal of outside forces and the whole area has ret-
urned to a position of relative peace. Because of these 
factors New Zealand's direct involvement in the region has 
therefore declined, or so it would seem. 
Despite this, however, it could well be said that 
perhaps the regional role of the armed forces has actually 
. grown in importance. The reason for this being that the 
importance of New Zealand to the region has actually increased, 
therefore the importance of the regional role of the armed 
forces must have increased. The reason for the increased 
importance of New Zealand in the South Pacific and also 
South East Asia stems from the fact that, with the withdrawal 
of both Britain and the United States from South East Asia, 
there is no longer any outside presence anywhere in the 
region. New Zealand's Singaporean battalion could be said 
to have assumed greater importance since it is the only 
remnant of the once substantial Five Power forces in Malaysia 
and Singapore, and the American fO~ throughout South East 
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Asia and makes New Zealand the only outside power with 
troops stationed anywhere in South East Asia. This is of 
course ridiculous since these troops remain principally 
to suit domestic New Zealand requirementsq13 The overall 
argument though does have validity. In Vietnam the New 
Zealand contingent was at no time more than a small per-
centage out o·f the total forces involved. While in 
Malaysia, New Zealand's contribution provided only a small 
part of the Commonwealth force. During these times, 
therefore, New Zealand's presence was virtually insignif-
icant, however with the withdrawal of these British and 
American troops, New ~ealand's presence, even if primarily 
contained within our own shores, assumes a far greater 
significance. 
With the American withdrawal from South East Asia -
as a result of the Guam Doctrine of 1969, which ended the 
policy of forward defence - and the British withdrawal in 
1971, the countries of Ble region were left to cater for 
their own defence. This has resulted in nations such as 
Singapore,14 Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia 
and so on all developing their own capabilities much further. 
As a result of this, whi~e there is no direct threat to the 
area at present, the level of preparedness is greater 
than ever before on the part of the nations of the region. 
It is interesting to compare defence spending by some 
of the nations of South East Asia and the South Pacific at 
the time when the general withdrawal of foreign troops took 
domestic requirements are the lack of suitable 
accommodation in New Zealand and the value the Singapore 
base has for army recruiting. 
14S ingapore 1975, Ministry of Culture, Singapore 1975, 
D. 87_ 
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place and seven years later in 1978-79. 
TABLE 4.1 
Defence Bud9:et 
($U.S.) 
1971 1978-79 
Australia 1,261,120,000 2,970,000,000 
New Zealand 123,704,000 313,000,000 
Indonesia 272,000,000 1,470,000,000 (' 79-80) 
Malaysia 186,000,000 693,000,000 
Philippines 135,500,000 793,000,000 
Thailand 260,300,000 940,000,000 ('79-80) 
Singapore 158,170,000 410,000,000 
Fiji . N .A. 3,600,000 
Source: Compiled from Military Balance 1972-3 and 1979-80~ 
These figures are, of course, influenced by inflation, 
but they do show the degree to which defence efforts have 
been improved. The trend then since the early seventies 
has been for the nations of South East Asia and also of the 
South Pacific to rely far more on themselves and each other 
for their defence. Although SEATO has virtually come to an 
end there is just as much, if not more, regional spirit and 
co-operation apparent than ever before. This would be 
true of New Zealand as well as the other nations in one 
sense at least. The stated desires and objectives of the 
Government indicate a greater concern for the region than 
ever before, however this is tempered with the realisation 
that "New Zealand can play no significant part in the area u • 15 
15Defence Review 1978, p. 18. 
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As was seen earlier New Zealand:' s military capability to 
contribute significantly to the defence of the South East 
Asian region has never been great and this is unlikely to 
change much in the future. It can still be said though 
that with the withdrawal from the area by Britain and 
Australia, New Zealand's role has increased, if not in a 
direct military capability, then in an economic and regional 
co-operation sense. The armed forces are important in both 
these respects. 
Although the actual contribution of the armed forces 
to South East Asia may not have increased, the mi tary's 
involvement in the South Pacific has almost certainly been 
developed during the period. With the continual worry tha~ 
outside interests may take an increased interest in the 
island states of the South Pacific in an economic and strat-
16 
egic sense, it has become important for New Zealand to 
show an interest in the protection of the area. This has 
been developed by such actions as supplying some of these 
nations with weapons and o)ther equipment17 by training 
their personnel and in th.e case of Fiji by providing a 
leader for their armed forces. 1g The operations of New 
Zealand's frigates, Orions and various other units are 
often centred around surveillance of the South Pacific since 
this is in the interests of both the countries of the area 
and also of New Zealand itse , since invariably any threat 
to New Zealand will either occur via the Pacific islands or 
The Evening Post, 24 April 1979. 
17New Zealand Herald Thursday, 10 May 1979. 
1 Ibid. 
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else result from a decline in the economic and political 
stability of any of these nations which could allow in the 
influence of outside powers. 
Whereas in the past New Zealand's concern has centred 
around events many thousands of miles away, usually in 
Europe,. and our battles have usually been fought in France 
or Belgium or some other foreign land, the period 1965 to 
1980 has seen a change in this pattern. In recent times our 
attention has turned more to our backyard, the South Paci c, 
and our own neighbourhood, South East Asia. The interest 
and concentration on these areas of the world has probably 
never been greater than during the period 1965-1980. It 
has been indicated by our military presence in Vietnam and 
Malaysia, the rst time a New Zealand army's prime concern 
has been a war so close to New Zealand, and by our increased 
presence in and assistance to the island states of the South 
Pacific. 
The reasons for this change in emphasis on New Zealand's 
part could be seen as partly natural progression or in a 
sense regression, partly due to the British joining of the 
EEe and their withdrawal from South East Asia, partly because 
of the United.States withdrawal from,the region and partly 
because of the increased concern for the region 1n a trade 
and strategic sense. While this increased concern may not 
have been accompanied by increased spending (in a relative 
sense) on equipment and on direct military aid, it has been 
expounded in military policy and priorities. The regional 
role of the armed forces has remained important throughout 
this period, therefore, and while culminating in actual 
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military involvement in Vietnam and Malaysia has neverthe-
less remained important since then. The probable increase 
in this role has occurred through a declining direct concern 
with affairs fUrther afield and through an increased economic 
interest in the region. Where economic interest is present 
military interest must also be present, at least where 
practicable. 
59 
CHAPTER V 
THE CIVIL ROLE 
While the main roles of the armed forces are undoubt-
edly those concerned with territorial defence, regional 
defence and alliance commitments, there is one other role. 
One that is not considered of primary importance, yet which 
may actually occupy a great deal of the military's time. 
This is the non-military or civil role, and often this is 
the role for which the military are considered most useful. 
In times of peace it is more common to associate the armed 
forces with such things as search and rescue, disaster 
relief and general emerge~cy operations than' with more 
obviously military occupations. This is the case in many 
countries around the world since it is generally only the 
armed forces that possess the manpower and technology usua-
lly required in times of emergency_ Seldom do other organ-
izations possess such extensive equipment and skills. 
The object of this chapter is to determine just how 
important this non-military role is in New Zealand. Both 
in relation to the other roles of the armed forces and in 
relation to the broader needs of the community. The aim is 
also to determine whether the relative importance of this 
role has changed during the period 1965-1980. Evidence 
for such a change would come primarily from official state-
ments such as in the Defence Reviews and annual Defence 
Reports and also from newspaper sources. Equipment 
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purchased and authorized for purchase during this period 
would also give some indication of relative importance, 
since some equipment is suited to both military and civil 
functions, while other types are designed solely for 
military uses. Obvious decisions in favour of one type or 
the other would certainly be significant. If it appears 
that there has been some change in the relative importance 
of this role during the period then some explanation will 
be sought for this. The most likely reasons for any change 
would probably stem from related changes in the domestic 
political environment, the international situation, economic 
circumstances, personality factors and general small state 
characteristics. These are the areas of importance to be 
studied in relation to the civil role of the New Zealand 
armed forces. , 
The significance of the military's contribution to 
the community in various roles is certainly nothing new. 
Throughout history the armed forces have been involved in 
assisting the community in ways often quite separate from 
their defined roles. The extent of this community involve-
ment on the part of the armed forces has, however, changed 
over time. Originally soldiers were specialists, trained 
and reserved solely for the purpose of fighting wars and 
crushing rebellions. This was possible since there were 
typically vast numbers of unemployed, unskilled people 
available in times of emergency or disaster. The only 
means of responding to such situations was of course with 
manpower since the limited technology available precluded 
any other response. Gradually over time though this 
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situation has changed. The costs today of maintaining a 
standing army, in a state of readiness for war, have become 
prohibitive, especially in times of continuing peace. Also 
in times of emergency often the only body of men trained 
and equipped to respond quickly and effectively are the 
armed forces. It has therefore become increasingly necess-
ary to utilise the armed forces and their expensive equip-
ment in the most efficient way possible. This has resulted 
in their. being used in emergency situations, rather than 
developing a separate organization to provide the same 
service. The military have also adopted several more 
routine roles, such as fisheries protection duties, which 
are necessary in situations where the Government cannot 
~fford to develop a specialist coast guard force, while at 
the same time maintaining an under utilized navy_ 
New Zealand, being a small state, finds it increas-
ingly difficult to develop and maintain a satisfactory 
military capability in these times of rapidly rising costs 
and inflation. While inflation and balance of payments 
problems make it difficult to spare the money for military 
purchases the increasing level of technological complexity 
involved in military equipment and its rapid obsolescence 
makes its cost increasingly prohibitive also. Add to this 
the high costs of providing accommodation and wages, and 
~t becomes difficult for any Government to justify military 
development, particularly when that Government is democrat- r 
ically elected and responsible to the populace for its 
actions, and when there appears to be no direct threat to 
New Zealand's sovereignty. This is the situation with which 
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New Zealand has been faced, particularly in the later years 
of the period 1965 to 1980. How has it affected the oper-
ations of the military in so far as their civil duties have 
been concerned. 
As would be expected in a small state with limited 
resources and an under utilized military, the armed forces 
have been utilized in various ways to provide a service for 
the community and to justify their existence. These areas 
include search and rescue, both on land and at sea, disaster 
relief, both in New Zealand and overseas, particularly in 
the South Pacific Region, fisheries protection originally 
within the twelve mile limit and since 1977 throughout the 
two hundred mile economic zone, general transport duties 
both across Cook Strait and to overseas destinations and 
various other forms of assistance to the civil community 
ranging from hydrographic research to training assistance 
to the aviation industry. 
The first point to look at is just how important the 
civil role of the armed forces is, both in relation to the 
armed forces other roles and in relation to the general 
needs of the community. As would be expected the military 
themselves consider the non-military role to be of little 
importance. As Lt. Gen. Thornton, the Chief of Defence 
staff from 1967 to 1972, put it: 
The military exist to exert violence against 
enemies and while they say they can be used for 
civil defence, search and rescue and civil aid 
this is not the reason for having them. 1 
This is, of course, true of any armed forces the world wide. 
Interview with Sir Leonard Thornton, Ch f of Defence 
Staff 1965-l972, Friday 14 December 1979, Wellington. 
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It is, however, interesting to compare this view with that 
of a politician, Arthur Faulkner, the Labour Minister of 
Defence from 1972 to 1975, who said the military "are there 
to serve a political purpose" 2 and since the politicians 
do not very often have a conflict situation for the military 
to solve then presumably this political purpose is often 
civil in nature. 
Generally the uses of the military for civil purposes 
can be divided into two distinct areas. One is services at 
home which will be looked at later, and the other is services 
abroad which function as aids to the Government's foreign 
policy. The Government's use of the military to assist in 
foreign policy usually takes in peaceful roles such as 
disaster reI , in response to cyclones or other natural 
disasters throughout the South Pacific region, or on occas-
ions, further abroad. An example of this was in 1972 when 
"extensive assistance was given by the RNZAF to the Fiji 
Government and the Gilbert and Ellice Administrations 
following Hurricane Bebe.,,3 During this operation over 
500 4 hours of flying time were clocked by the Air Force. 
The Government also provides on-going assistance to various 
countries in the South Pacific and further abroad. For 
several years ending in 1971 army engineers were involved 
in constructing a 144 kilometre long road in Thailand. 5 
There have also been numerous operations in the Paci c 
2Interview with Arthur Faulkner, Minister of De 
1972-1975, Wednesday 12 December 1979, Wellington. 
3Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1973, p. 5. 
4Ibid • 
5 . 6 Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1972, p •.• 
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Islands including reef demolitions, harbour building, 
road building, and so on. This form of assistance to these 
nations is just as beneficial to New Zealand's overseas 
standing as is direct military intervention as in South 
Vietnam and Malaysia. Invariably it involves the military 
in operations for which' they are not directly designed, 
but for 'which they prove ideal. The role of the armed 
forces therefore in the furtherance of Government foreign 
policy during this period has not necessarily been restric-
ted only to their operation in Malaysia and South Vietnam, 
or anywhere else where their prime concern has been milit-
ary intervention. 
Along with their overseas duties in response to Govern-
ment policies the armed forces are also used extensively in 
non-military roles at home. Again in accordance with the 
Government's policy. As with their international operations 
the internal operations of the military are also split into 
two distinct areas. One an on-going involvement in fields 
such. as fisheries protection, and the other being in 
continuous readiness to respond to any unforeseen occurrence. 
The importance of the navy's role in patrolling the 
two hundred mile economic zone is unquestionable. The sea 
is o~e of New Zealand's major resources and it is crucial 
that this resource be adequately protected. When the twelve 
mi economic zone wa~ first established in 1966, New 
Zealand's ability to patrol this region was limited, con-
sisting primarily of the minesweepers Inverell and Kiama, 
6 
and several 1942 and 1944 vintage harbour patrol craft, 
Janes Fighting Ships 1974-1975. Captain John E. Moore 
(ede), Janes Yearbooks, London, p. 242. 
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with occasional assistance from aircraft and frigates. As 
the period progressed these craft became less and less sea-
worthy and were restricted to certain coastal waters. Not 
until 1974 when the first of four Lake class patrol craft, 
Rotoiti and Pukaki were received and followed a year later 
by the Taupo and Hawea,7 did the navy's ability to adequately 
protect our ocean resources improve. It was, however, still 
limited, especially when the new two hundred mile economic 
zone came into force in 1977. To assist with the patroll-
ing of this new greatly enlarged area the frigate Taranaki 
was converted to fisheries protection duties and more use 
was made of aircraft. However, to date no adequate method 
of enforcing our claims to our 200 mile zone has been de v-
eloped and this is an area where the navy and also the air 
fOrces influenc~ can only increase in importance. There 
would certainly be some basis for saying that of all the 
armed forces roles and sub-roles none has exhibited a need 
and desire for expansion equal to that of the fisheries pro-
tection role. It is the one role where the Government real-
ises a greater capability is needed and has made various 
moves th h th ' d h' h' 8 roug out e perlo to ac leve t lS. 
The search and rescue role is one shared equally by 
all three services although it is probably most significant 
to the airforce. While it is really a role where the services 
respond to unexpected occurrences it is of such a magnitude 
that it is virtually an on-going concern, especially for 
helicopter pilots. The importance of this role can be seen 
7Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1976, p. 16. 
8 
Defence Review 1978, p. 28. 
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best by looking at some of the figures of man hours and 
flying hours involved. Whi these figures are not consist-
ently available for all the various missions throughout 
the period, those that are available give some insight into 
the time involved. 
TABLE 5.1 
Year Air Force Flying Army SAR exerc Navy SAR 
Hours in Search & operations operations 
and Rescue 
1968 503 9 exercises, 17 
21 emergencies 
1969 425 7 and 21 
1970 272 7 and 8 
1971 270 14 and 14 18 
1972 500 
1973 450 13 emergencies 
1974 n.a. 
1975 430 35 emergencies 5 
1976 400 
1977 410 32 emergencies 
Source: com~~i~d from information contained in Defence 
Reports 1968 to 1977. 
Despite the gaps there is sufficient depth to. give 
some indication of just how much time is involved in Search 
and Rescue, particularly for the air force. It must be 
remembered also that every flying hour would translate into 
many more man hours. The air force's flying hours do not 
show any strong trend throughout the period, being subject 
to distortion by excessively long operations at times. The 
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number of army SAR operations, though, does not appear to 
be on the increase, al though again these figures vary greatly 
from year to year. 
Search and Rescue is a very important part of the 
military's activities both from the point of their own 
time and equipment involved and also in so far as its value 
to the civilian community is concerned. There is no other 
organization that either does or could provide a similar 
service. If the armed services were not available to nor 
prepared to provide this service, then it would either not 
exist at all, or else it would have to be provided complet-
ely from scratch by the Government. A very costly propos 
tion indeed. The importance of the Search and Rescue role 
of the armed forces in therefore certainly immense. 
These' are the two non .... mili tary type roles most appa-
rent to the community as a whole. There are, however, 
various others. Two of these are provided by the navy. 
One is hydrographic research, which until 1975 was conducted 
by the HMNZS Lachlan. Since 1978 it has been carried out 
by the HMNZS Monowai, which was previously the island 
trader Moana Roa .• 9 The other is ocean research which 1S 
provided by the HMNZS Tui, previously the United States 
Navy ship, Charles H. Davis. 10 As a result of the operations 
of these two vess and their pred~cessors, many thousands 
of miles of ocean bed and shore line have been char~ed and 
surveyed. Providing information invalu~able to both naval 
and civilian users ike. In 1967 the Hydrographic Supplies 
Report of the Ministry of Defence 1978, p. 16. 
lOJanes Fighting Ships 1974-1975, op cit., p. 242. 
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Department distributed 23,761 charts and 977 11 navigational 
books both overseas and in New Zealand. By 1976 these 
12 figures had risen to 55,140 and 4,504 respectively. 
The air force also provides many important services 
for the civil community. One of these has been the carrying 
of cars and passengers across Cook Strait in 1971,1976 and 
1979 to remove the backlog created by rail ferry strikes. 
The air force, using six aircraft, flew 308 flights and 
13 
carried 1,448 passengers and 694 cars across Cook Strait 
during November 1971. Another occasion on which the 
military have been involved in a strike situation was in 
relation to the Lytte1ton tunnel dispute of 1979 when the 
called in to the tunnel. 14 This army was re-open was, 
however, an unusual situation and the armed forces have 
stated that they will not be used for b1atent1y political 
15 purposes. 
Returning to the air force, though, one of their most 
common duties is to fly personnel and equipment to isolated 
islands and countries to conduct research or disaster 
relief operations. During 1976 the air force flew to Niue, 
Fiji, Katmandu, Dacca, Calcutta, Burma, Tonga, Western 
16 Samoa and Raratonga as part of the Government's aid pro-
gramme. They also flew to many New Zealand locations or 
possessions. 
11 Report of the Ministry of Defence 1968, p. 17. 
12Ibid ., 1977, p. 13. 
13Ibid ., 1972, p. 15. 
14The Press., 26 March 1979. 
15The Evening Post, 19 April 1979. 
16 Report of the Ministry of Defence 1977, p. 10. 
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Another role was that introduced at the start of this 
period with the arrival of New Zealand's first Hercules, 
and which has increased ever since, has been the flights 
to Antarctica every summer in support of New Zealand's 
Antarctic programme. This is a developing role which only 
commenced at the start of the period under consideration 
and which has grown greatly in importance. New Zealand's 
interest in the Antarc c has been made possible by the 
transport and commucication provided by the air force: 
Between the 9th of November and the 9 th of December 
1977, two Hercules aircraft based in Christchurch 
flew 9 return flights to McMurdo Sound transporting 
287,700 lb of equipment and 237 personnel. 17 
The interest in this area of the world is growing all the 
time and the airforce's role will certainly grow even 
further. 
The army are also involved in many operations related 
to the civil community. In 1975, for instance, they were 
involved in a total of 500 separate activities representing 
5,000 man hours. 18 By 1977 this was 363 projects taking 
19 6,500 man hours. Although corresponding figures are not 
available for all earlier years, this does give a very good 
indication of just how much the army interact with society, 
at large. The types of activities the army are involved in 
include such things as bomb disposal, engineering operations 
both at horne and abroad, and also general functions such as 
transport, cooking, security and so on. 
Th look at some of the role of the armed forces as 
t of the Ministry of Defence 1978,p. 13. 
l8 Ibid ., 1976, p. 11. 
19 Ib1'd., 1978 14 , p. • 
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they assist the civil community, has shown just how exten-
sive their assistance is and just how important, and in 
most cases, irreplaceable it is. It has also, to a limited 
extent, looked at the changes in the scope and importance 
of this civil role throughout the period from 1965 to 1980. 
It is now time to look even deeper into the important ques-
tion of whether the civil role of the armed forces has 
.increased or decreased in importance during this period. 
Once this has been done it may become necessary to explain 
why these changes have taken place, and what the indications 
are for the future. 
The easiest aspect of the armed forces civil involve-
ment to study for changes during this period is the fish-
eries protection role. While many of the other activities 
occur in response to events that are uncontrollable and 
unpredictable, the fisheries protection task continues 
unaffected by unpredictable elements. It quickly becomes 
apparent that this task has certainly increased in import-
ance, predominantly because the economic zone has increased 
from 12 to 200 miles. The introduction of new patrol 
craft and the transfer of a frigate indicate the increased 
importance of this role in the eyes of the Government. The 
1972 Defence Review stressed that preparations for major 
hostilities were receiving less emphasis than in 1966, 
while more resources were being devoted to maritime sur-
. .. . 20 
vel11ance and flsherles proteGtlon. 
Defence Review 1972, p. 23. 
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Other aspects of the civil role also achieved greater 
significance during the period 1965 to 1980. The 1978 
Defence Review stated that one of the major defence policy 
objectives was tfie"supplying of defence capabilities in 
support of the needs of the New Zealand societYo,,2l It also 
stressed the requirement of "making use of trained, mobile 
and self-sufficient defence forces to provide on request, 
military assistance, technical aid, surveillance of outside 
activities, search and rescue, and disaster relief services 
in the South Pacific", and "maintaining a capability for 
limited support of national research and other interests 
, t' ,,22 ln Antarc lca. These desires were apparent throughout 
the l~tter part of the period in question, with the increased 
use of military resources and personnel in areas such as 
overseas aid projects, internal transport, and areas of 
assistance to the community other than those of an emergency 
nature. 
Whereas some of the reasons for this change in the 
importance of the military~s civil role are readily apparent, 
others are less so and therefore more significant. Also 
important are those factors which tend to indicate that this 
increased importance of the civil role may be occurring at 
the expense of other more traditional, and more directly 
military roles. An indicator of the fact that the civil 
role:" s significance may be increasing at the expense of 
another role, is the pattern of equipment purchases and 
intended purchases during the period. 
fence Review 1978, p. 18. 
22 b' d 19 110f p. • 
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The major purchase during the 1970s has been the 
frigate HMNZS Canterbury. While this is obviously very 
much a piece of military hardware, it can also be seen as 
a means of patrolling New Zealand's economic zone. The 
most significant aspect of its purchase though, was that it 
was the fourth of what was planned to become by 1980 a six 
23 frigate naval force. This force never eventuated, and 
in fact a planned replacement for the almost obsolete Otago 
h b d . d f' . 1 24 th th . as een postpone ln e lnlte y. So, ra er an lncrease 
in size, the New Zealand navy is actually decreasing. By 
the mid 1980s the effective naval force will consist of two 
25 
ships, the Canterbury and Waikat~, in contrast to the four 
ship navy at the start of the period. While it is true 
that present day ships possess a much greater fire power than 
their pre'd,acessors,' there is no way that two warships can 
be as effective as four. 
Apart from the Canterbury no other major purchases of 
solely military orientated equipment have been made during 
~ seventies except for the Skyhawks and the recently 
announced Scorpions. The Skyhawks have never seen combat 
and would be very unlikely to survive any such encounter 
anyway. The Scorpions are of dubious value wi th the unlikeli-
hood of anyone ever attacking New Zealand by tank, and their 
usefulness in any overseas campaign New Zealand may embark 
upon must also be questionable. The value there£ore of 
solely military purchases must be questionable especially 
23The Press 9 August 1976. 
2 The Press, 31 January 1980. 
25 Report of the Ministry of Defence 1967, p. 24. 
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in contrast to the other equipment. 
Virtually all the remaining purchases of equipment 
for the New Zealand armed forces have a direct civil value 
which is often greater than their military value. These 
include the Hercules, the Andovers, and also the twin engine 
helicopters being considered. It is interesting to note 
that one of the main reasons proposed in favour of these 
helicopters is that "such aircraft also offer potential for 
coastal fisheries protection and Antarctic support ta~ks."26 
The navy has purchased a research ship, hydrographic ship 
and four fisheries protection craft, but is unable to 
obtain the frigate it desires. The airforce has little 
likelihood of obtaining replacements for its Skyhawks 
but is about to revamp its Orions and has received the 
d d . 1 h 'd h' 2~ An overs an Just recent y t ree Fr~en s ~ps. These 
will be primarily used for transport purposes in which 
case they will benefit the civil community. The most 
suitable equipment for the army would include ground 
to air and surface to surface missiles, but its chances 
of getting these are so remote they do not even bother 
asking. They have, however, been able to obtain. general 
purpose vehicles and radio equipment. It is therefore 
readily apparent that the decision whether or not to 
purchase certain equipment can be largely influenced by its 
civil value. 
The reasons for this change of emphasis on the civil 
role are difficult to determine, however,it appears they 
fence Review 1978, p. 40. 
27 The Press, 28 February 1980. 
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can be narrowed down to two and possibly three factors. 
These are the changing international situation with the 
lack of potential aggressors in the Pacific, and the 
changing economic situation with its associated problems 
for all spheres of New Zealand society. Another possible 
cause could be changes in the domestic political situation. 
A combination of no potential aggressor and a declining 
balance of payments means it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for New Zealand Governments to justify increases 
in defence spending, even if it is only required to main-
tain the existing level of capabilities. If it can be 
proven that new defence equipment has a valuable use in a 
non-military role then the chances of it being purchased 
are far greater. This being the main way in which both 
the military and the Government can justify defence expend-
iture. 
This lack of finance, of course, is no new thing in 
defence planning. As early as 1967 the Defence Report re-
ported that "the deferments of decisions on virtually all 
the major projects envisaged in the White Paper made neces-
sary by the economic situation had inevitably set back the 
28 
White Paper timetable." This is still the story today. 
Even when New Zealand was involved in the war in Vietnam, 
the armed forces did not receive much additional funding, 
primarily because they used American equipment rather than 
having to provide their own. This factor is still import-
ant today in that it is probably correctly assumed that if 
New Zealand armed forces had to go to war overseas they v:' 
28 f th ..' f D f 1967 2 Report 0 e Mlnlstry 0 e ence ,p.. 
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would be equipped with essential equipment and logistical 
support by their allies, most probably the United States. 
In the meantime only limited equipment is required for 
training purposes. Therefore, the lack of finance, coupled 
with the lack of any potential aggressor, and the reliance 
on allies for logistical support provide major reasons for 
the relative increase in the non-military role at the 
expense of the other three. 
One other reason for such a situation occurring could 
be possible changes in domestic political circumstances. 
Remembering of course that National was the Government from 
1965 to 1972 and again from 1975 to 1980, with Labour having 
a three year term inbetween, National has tradi tionally had 
stronger concern for defence than Labour, and as a result 
of-the 1972 election and the corning to power of the Labour 
Party, two major changes immediately took place. These 
were the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the last New 
Zealand troops and the ending of military conscription. 
The Labour years saw a reduction of defence spending as a 
percentage of Gross National Product and of Government 
expenditure. 29 Since then these figures have never again 
reached the same level as under the previous National 
Government. Mr Rowling has said "I've always believed that 
our armed forces could play a very useful peacetime role 
and should be equipped and trained to maximise their effort 
in this area.,,30 He also sad that "it is important to 
fer to p. 9. 
30 h d 1···· th' th Jo n Hen erson, an exc USlve lntervlew w~ . e 
Leader of the Opposition, in International Review, September/ 
October 1977, p. 6. 
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ensure they're not just sort of idling about the Place. 1I31 
The Labour Party then'appears devoted to maximising the 
use of the military for non-military functions. The Nat-· 
ional Party also seems similarly concerned33 and overall it 
ould appear that the general political consensus has' 
moved in favour of greater utilisation of the armed forces 
and greater rationalisation of equipment purchases. This 
would of course have been influenced by the other two 
factors, lack of a potential aggressor and financial 
problems • 
The trend, therefore, during this period has been for 
a move towards greater stress on the civil uses of the 
armed forces coupled with perhaps a lessening of emphasis 
on some of the other roles. While this may not have been 
an intentional shift it has nevertheless occurred. It 
looks like becoming an increasingly important aspect of all 
future defence considerations. 
77 
ION 
This concludes the study of New Zealand's defence 
situation during the past fifteen years. The whole ques-
tion of defence as it exists in New Zealand has been 
looked at in relation to its four primary roles. This 
approach has revealed several significant factors and 
developments over the fifteen year period from 1965 to 
1980" The object now is to interpret ·these changes, to 
see just why and how differing factors have influenced 
defence planning and policies during this period. In 
this way it hoped that some indicator of future defence 
trends may become apparent. 
The best way to approach this would be to briefly 
summarise the trends and changes within each of the four 
roles, alliance, territorial, regional and civil. As was 
seen more fully in Chapter Two, New Zealand relies almost 
completely on its allies for assistance in defence. With-
out the deterrent effect provided by the United States 
especially, New Zealand would be in a consid~rably weaker 
defence position. These days the major alliance is ANZUS 
with SEATO and the Five Power Defence Arrangements being 
less significant. Throughout tht= period in question New 
Zea1and 1 s contribution to our alliances has never been 
very great and the relationships have been essentially 
one sided as far as the actual contributions have been 
concerned.. The reason for this that there is no 
criteria set down concerning just how much each member 
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should be required to contribute to the alliance. New 
Zealand has therefore been able to remain a member of 
ANZUS while contributing very little to the alliance. If 
anything this fact has become even more apparent as the 
period has progressed. 
It is hard to envisage any possible change in this 
situation without the advent of some direct threat to New 
Zealand's sovereignty. While the United States makes 
request for further contributions from their allies they 
show no signs of taking action when these requests are 
met by vague promises rather than specific commitments. 
Therefore while the alliance role has probably never been 
more significant to New Zealand, this has not been matched 
by any obvious signs of priority in terms of defence 
policies. 
The territorial role is also one of crucial import-
ance to any country. However in New Zealand it seems to 
receive less priority than some of the other roles. The 
feeling apparently being that the best means of providing 
for territorial defence is by retaining good allies. 
Adequate territorial defence is of course almost imposs-
ible to achieve, especially given New Zealand's limited 
resources and difficult geographical factors. This means 
that the question must be asked as to just how useful it 
is to provide partial territorial defence. It might be 
that no territorial defence at all is considered to be 
just as useful as only partial defence. 
Whether this is in fact the case 1n New Zealand 
or not, the fact remains that territorial defence is 
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accorded very little effort in the overall scheme of 
defence. This has been the Case throughout the period 
1965 to 1980 and it appears to be becoming even more 
apparent during the latter stages of this period. Equip-
ment purchased or approved, and policies enacted or 
proposed tend to show a declining interest in providing 
for territorial defence. Perhaps this is only to be 
expected in view of the impossibility of providing anything 
remotely adequate for New Zealand's needs. 
The third role looked at was the regional role and 
it becomes apparent that this is an important part of 
New Zealand's total defence priorities. In the early 
part of this period the commitment to regional defence 
problems was best exempli ed by involvement in the Viet-
nam crisis and earlier still in the Malaysian crisis. 
While the New Zealand presence in these two areas was 
relatively insignificant and required by our alliance 
commi tments tit w·as sufficient to show that New Zealand 
views events in the Asian Pacific region with concern. 
One trend over the longer term and continuing during this 
period has been an almost complete detachment from all 
~ilitary developments on an international scale especially 
in Europe and a concentration on the more significant -
at least in so far as New Zealand is concerned ~ local 
scene. New Zealand with her limited resources and capab-
ilities is better off deploying these where they can ~e 
most useful. And that means the Asian Pacific and most 
especially the South Pacific region. There is no indica-
tion that the importance of the regional role is such that 
new equipment is being purchased with this in mind, nor 
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has there been any concerted effort to change overall 
defence strategies, however it does seem that the regional 
role has developed in importance even though the actual 
military presence has virtually ended. 
The fourth role looked at was not directly concerned 
with actual defence activities but rather with the civil 
orientation of the armed forces. Armed forces have always 
been concerned to some extent with activities of a non-
military nature due to their very position in society. 
This is no less true of New Zealand than of any other 
modern nation. In fact, the smaller the state the more 
important these non-military duties become. In times of 
disaster or emergency the military provide the only body 
of highly trained and well equipped men capable of 
responding in the correct manner. The armed forces are 
also especially useful in a country such as New Zealand 
in providing Search and Rescue and fisheries protection 
capabilities. During the period 1965 to 1980 the armed 
forces became increasingly involved in civil duties because 
of the need to utilize their resources most e cient1y 
and because of the increasing importance of sheries 
protection type duties. This role ~eems to be accorded 
a great deal of importance by the policy makers while at 
the same time being acknowledged as only of seeondary 
importance in the armed forces' overall duties. One of 
the important features of the majority of the equipment 
purchased during this period has been its suitability for 
civil as well as military uses. 
As far as the changing relative importance of the 
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four primary roles are concerned it is harder to describe 
a specific pattern during this period. As mentioned above 
the civil role to all intents and purposes appears to 
have gained in priority, but at the same time it could 
not be said that any other particular role has declined 
noticably by comparison. The alliance role has maintained 
if not increased in importance due t6 New Zealand's pecu-
liar situation in the world. At the same time the prior-
ity given to new developments in overall Government 
regional policy has resulted in continued importance being 
. given to the military's part in this area. It does appear 
that perhaps the territorial defence aspects of the 
military's duties have suffered as a consequence of devel-
opments in other areas, and because of the relative imposs-
ibility 0f adequately fulfilling this role. 
( ; 
During the period 1965 to 1980 then some noticable 
changes have occurred in New Zealand defence roles and 
policies, changes which will almos.t certainly have a 
signi cant influence on future New Zealand defence 
trends. The reasons for these changes or trends are 
probably many and varied, but it does appear that factors 
such as financial constraints and PQlitically inspired 
changes have played a significant part. As was seen 
earlier various influencing factors in the international 
environment have also been important in decision-making 
related to defence policy. The difficult point is to 
decide which has been most important, the lack of finance 
or the changing international environment. In the past 
New Zealand has always shown that it will respond to a 
B2 
deteriorating international situation by devoting more 
Of its resources to defence regardless of the cost involved 
so it must be assumed that this would happen also in the 
event of any future military threat in the South Pacific 
or South East Asia area which directly involves New 
Zealand. The poor financial situation in New Zealand 
however has meant that New Zealand's defence commitments 
are probably less than they would be if this situation 
did not exist. 
The important thing is to determine just what these 
factors mean as far as the adequacy or otherwise of New 
Zealand's defence resources are concerned. Both major 
political parties agreethabJNew Zealand should continue 
to maintain its military resources with emphasis being 
placed on the. development of a skilled base force of 
highly trained personnel rather than a build up of 
expensive equipment. What influence will this type of 
development have on New Zealand's military capabilities 
and to what extent has this become apparent during the 
period 1965 to 19BO? 
The massive cost of modern military equipment means 
it is not viable for a country in New Zealand's situation, 
therefore the policy has been to train personnel who 
will be able to opera.te modern equipment should the need 
arise. The assumption being that any such equipment will 
\ 
be provided by our allies the United States, since the 
lead up time in the ordering of hew equipment is such 
that this option would not be viable. The consequences 
of not keeping up with new developments in military 
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technology and trying to exist with equipment that is in 
many cases almost obsolete could be disturbing for New 
Zealand. In a time when military equipment is becoming 
very complex New Zealand is continuing to operate out-
dated equipment. This means that New Zealand's capabil-
ities are declining in relation to other countries and 
also that the gap is becoming so great that the financial 
and technological possibilities of ever catching up with 
modern technology must be limited. New Zealand's defence 
spending has been declining relatively during this 
period, especially in the field of capital expenditure on 
new equipment. To purchase this equipment in the future 
is going to require a disproportionately higher expenditure. 
The likelihood of this expenditure being allowed by the 
Government without any direct threat existing is rather 
slim which means that any run-down in defence expenditure 
and development will have an exaggerated effect in the 
future. That is to say, that the frigate not purchased 
now for $250 million is not likely to be purchased for 
$500 million in five or six years. Therefore it can be 
seen as a dangerous precedent to lag behind other nations 
in the acquisition of new technologies, because in most 
cases the gap can never be bridged. 
During the fifteen years between 1965 and 1980 it 
would be fair to say that New Zealand's military capab-
ilities declined. The reasons for this were many-fold, 
lack of money, lack of a perceived threat, advances in 
other countries not matched in New Zealand and a more 
restrained approach by the politicians. The best 
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indicator of the changing view of defence can be seen in 
the changed perception of the armed forces civil role. 
As the active roles of the military decline the need 
becomes one of utilizing the resources tied up in this 
area. The best way of utilizing these resources is by 
deploying the milita~y in functions helpful to the public 
good. In New Zealand this means that the image of the 
military in the eyes of the public has become one of a 
force specialising in fisheries protection, search and 
rescue, civil defence duties, and general public assistance 
duties. This could well be the first step in the gradual 
downgradi~g of the armed forces. While these civil 
duties are obviously essential they should be seen as 
developing along with the other roles of the armed forces 
rather than instead of these other roles. It would be 
true to say that the civil role has developed further than 
the other roles of the armed forces during this period. 
The future development of the armed forces can take 
one of three courses. They can be downgraded completely 
with a limited force retained to provide the civil func-
tions so necessary in any nation. They can continue as 
they are at present being left to drift behind develop-
ments overseas in which case they will eventually end up 
in a similar way to the first option. Or they can be 
maintained at such a level that they provide a viable 
deterrent to any sm~ll scale attack and a viabThe contri-
bution as far as New Zealand's alliance commitments are 
concerned. Th third option would require a substant-
ially increased budget in the immediate future but once 
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a viable force has again been developed it could be main-
tained at an acceptable level. If the ,armed forces are 
left to drift as they are at present it will become almost 
impossible to return them to a satisfactory standard, 
should this policy then be adopted in the future. New 
Zealand's defence can therefore be seen to be at a 
turning point. During the period examined, various changes' 
have occurred in the relative importance of the four key 
roles with the non-military role, gaining to some extent 
'at the expense of the others. A continuation of the 
trend during this period would see the active usefulness 
of the New Zealand armed forces decline to such an extent 
. , 
that they would become little more than a police and 
civil defence force by the end of the century if not 
before. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this is perhaps 
not entirely disastrous as far as New Zealand's security 
is concerned, but unless some concrete ,decisions are made 
concerning the place and role of the armed forces within 
New Zealand s?ciety, then any future spending on defence 
is likely to be misguided and wasteful. 
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